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Abstract: 
Financial integration in East Asia has been building steadily over the past two decades. In order 
to support this process, officials in the region have undertaken a range of initiatives. These 
include, in particular, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), the Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), regional initiatives of international 
organizations such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), and aspects of ASEAN, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN+3. Prior 
to the global financial crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone debt crisis, the European Union had served 
as a model for East Asian financial integration. The lessons learnt by the failure of EU 
institutions to deal first with the consequences of the GFC and subsequently with the Eurozone 
debt crisis are also useful and, in part, relevant to the East Asian financial integration process. 
This paper reviews the causes of the Eurozone financial crisis and draws parallels with the weak 
institutional infrastructures underpinning East Asian financial arrangements. The paper focuses 
on two areas of great concern: (a) crisis prevention and (b) crisis resolution. In particular, it 
highlights the challenges raised by integrated supra-national banking markets in the absence of 
suitable institutions to absorb financial stability shocks. Based on this discussion the paper will 
present suggestions for future development of East Asian regional financial arrangements as they 
relate to crisis prevention and resolution. Finally, the paper links the financial stability debate 
with the more general issues of financial liberalization and free movement of capital, trade in 
financial services, and freedom of establishment in the context of the AEC and ASEAN+3.  
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I. Introduction  
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, two sets of policies (and approaches to economic 
development) battled for supremacy: (a) protectionism, which conditions economic development 
on closed markets and (b) liberalization and regional market integration. This was a battle that 
was soon lost by the supporters of protectionism. In the 2000s liberalization and market 
integration came to be regarded as the only sustainable path to the region’s continuous economic 
prosperity. East Asian countries have expended a great deal of effort on the development of 
regional financial arrangements to support regional financial integration and stability.1 These 
include, in particular, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), the Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) and aspects of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN+3.2 Prior 
to the global financial crisis and the Eurozone financial crisis, the European Union was often 
portrayed as a positive model for East Asian regional institutional arrangements.  
 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis spread to most of the developed economies, including 
those of the European Union. Irrespective of the nature and extent of banking and securities 
regulation harmonization and form of regulatory structures (be it unitary in the United Kingdom, 
twin-peaks in the Netherlands, or sectoral at the regional level) almost all EU jurisdictions lacked 
proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with respect to the inevitable strong cross-border 
dimensions of a global crisis.3 This led to a threat of widespread bank failures in EU countries 
and near collapse of their financial systems. The GFC bore striking similarities but also 
considerable differences with the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. Today, in the midst of 
the Eurozone financial crisis, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide whether the road 
to recovery runs through closer integration of financial policies and of bank supervision and 
resolution, or is subject to a gradual return to controlled forms of protectionism in the pursuit of 
narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to endanger the single market. Therefore, 
the policy dilemmas facing the EU and contemporary institution building within the Eurozone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, signed at Cha-am, 
2  
3 See E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics 
(CUP, 2012), ch. 6. See also Recine, F., & Teixeira, P. G. (November 2009). The New Financial Stability 
Architecture in the EU (November 2009). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-62. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1509304. 
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can provide a range of useful lessons for the future development of regional financial 
arrangements. It is in this context that this paper discusses the lessons the Eurozone crisis holds 
for East Asian regional financial arrangements, specifically focusing on crisis prevention and 
crisis resolution mechanisms. Based on a review of the Eurozone / EU experience to date, the 
paper considers the future development of East Asian regional financial arrangements, focusing 
on CMIM, EMEAP and ASEAN/+3, especially as they relate to crisis prevention and resolution. 
Finally, the paper looks forward to possible lessons for future financial liberalization initiatives 
in the context of ASEAN/+3 and related objectives of free movement of capital, trade in 
financial services trade, and free establishment. 
A central idea of this paper is that the design of institutions underpinning regional 
integration has to be a step-by-step process. From CMI to CMIM and from ASEAN to 
ASEAN+3 and AEC, East Asian arrangements follow a pattern of development of institutions 
that presents striking similarities with that followed by the EU, albeit over many previous 
decades, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic 
Community (EEC)4 and from there to the EU and ultimately to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the single currency.5 Arguably, problems will 
inevitably arise when a supra-national market exhibits a high degree of integration but the 
development of cross-border regulatory mechanisms lags significantly behind. This shortcoming 
has become acutely evident in the course of the current Eurozone crisis. In this context, we 
explain the European crisis as the result of four interlocking crises: a banking crisis, a 
competitiveness crisis, payment imbalances within the Eurozone indicating structural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The EU traces its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The ECSC was established in 1951; it was a six-nation international 
organization serving to abolish trade barriers in the areas covered by the Treaty between the democratic 
nations of Western Europe, as the Cold War had divided the geographic area covered by European 
nations in two via the so-called ‘iron curtain’. The ECSC was the first purely European organization in 
the postwar era to be based on the principles of supra-nationalism. The Treaty of Rome established the 
EEC in 1957 on much broader objectives and principles of co-operation for the achievement of which it 
also introduced a number of permanent supra-national institutions, such as the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
5 The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU) in 1993. The same Treaty introduced the 
charter of the European Monetary Union. The EU Treaty has undergone a series of amendments as its 
ambit and reach, both in terms of new members in terms of powers, became ever broader. The latest 
amendment of the EU treaty is the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009. 
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asymmetries, and a sovereign debt crisis.6 This paper will analyse how similar mistakes are 
repeated in the Asian integration process where some aspects, for example, transactional 
integration have moved much faster than other pre-requisites of financial integration. 
 The paper is in five parts. Part I is the present introduction. Part II provides an analytical 
overview of economic and institutional developments relating to the EU single market for 
financial services in the pre-crisis period. Part III discusses the accepted causes of the Eurozone 
crisis and the way this evolved to become the most important threat to global financial stability 
today. Requisite discussion extends to the evolution of institutional infrastructure safeguarding 
financial stability and the effective supervision of financial institutions in the EU from its early 
stages. Part III reviews the main tenets of the European Banking Union and considers how this 
new set of EU institutions will affect EU’s economic and political integration. Part IV provides 
an analytical overview of the East Asian regional financial arrangements and offers a critical 
evaluation of such arrangements and of their potential vulnerabilities. Part V concludes with a 
proposal that may be of critical importance to the future of financial integration in East Asia. 
 
II.  Development of the EU Single Financial Market  
A.  Challenges of European Financial Integration  
The European experience constitutes the most advanced global laboratory for regional economic, 
legal, and political integration.7 Thus, it is worth examining the process of regional financial 
integration, as it developed in Europe, in order to discern inherent and artificial obstacles to 
efficient financial governance regimes for an integrated market. The establishment of pan-
European banks has, of course, been the most potent integrative factor, in an environment 
marked, at least at the earlier stages, by absence of regulatory cohesion. At the same time, it was 
inevitable that the concurrent presence of pan-European banks and of incoherent regulatory 
structures would lead to financial instability across the single market and especially across the 
single currency area, in the event of serious market turbulence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Presentation by Avgouleas, E. (July 2012). Eurozone Crisis and Sovereign Debt restructuring: 
Intellectual Fallacies and New Lines of Research, given to the Society of International Economic Law 
(SIEL), 3rd Biennial Global Conference, National University of Singapore. 
7 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). The G20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons from 
Multilevel European Governance? Journal of International Economic Law. doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgs036 
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The establishment of a single currency area (the Eurozone) and the pan-European 
presence of a number of large banks with large cross-border operations lent urgency to questions 
about long-term protection of EU-wide financial stability in the absence of appropriate 
institutional arrangements.8 The so-called financial stability trilemma,9 which states that the 
(three) objectives of financial stability, financial integration, and national financial policies 
cannot be combined at the same time, has precisely described the acute policy tradeoff which 
holds that one of these objectives has to give in to safeguard the other two.10 Inspite assertions to 
the contrary,11 the recent crisis has proven beyond doubt that a common currency area is not 
viable without building, at the same time, transnational supervisory structures in the field of 
fiscal monitoring and responsibility and bank supervision. 
Arguably, an essential pre-requisite of financial market integration is importation of a 
harmonized set of core rules, which border on uniformity12 and are binding in all jurisdictions 
comprising the single market. Absence of such uniformity can, in theory, seriously hinder market 
integration as it can give rise to regulatory arbitrage and hidden protectionism and harm efficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In 2005 Schoenmaker and Oosterloow conducted a statistical study spanning a four-year period (2000-
03) on the potential emergence of pan-European banking groups. To this effect they gathered a new data 
set on cross-border penetration (as a proxy for cross-border externalities) of 30 large EU banking groups. 
They found a home country bias, but the data indicated that the number of groups having potential to pose 
significant cross-border externalities within the EU context was not only substantial but also increasing. 
Policymakers therefore had to face the challenge of designing European structures for financial 
supervision and stability to deal effectively with these emerging European banking groups. See for 
details, Schoenmaker, D., & Oosterloow, S. (2005). Financial Supervision in an Integrating Europe: 
Measuring Cross-Border Externalities. International Finance, 8(1), 1–27. 
9 See, Schoenmaker, D. (February, 2011). The Financial Trilemma. Duisenberg School of Finance 
Amsterdam & Finance Department VU University Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; 
Forthcoming in Economics Letters, 7. See also, Thygesen, N. (2003). Comments on The Political 
Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe. In J. Kremer, D. Schoenmaker & P. Wierts (Eds.), 
Financial Supervision in Europe: Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
10 C.f. Lastra and Louis who (perhaps more accurately) describe the same trade off as an ‘inconsistent 
quartet’ of policy objectives: free trade, full capital mobility, pegged (or fixed) exchange rates and 
independent national monetary policies (Lastra, R. M., & Louis, J.-V. (2013). European Economic and 
Monetary Union: History, Trends, and Prospects. Yearbook of European Law. 
  
11 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings and 
the Genies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
12 Uniformity in this context only means the need to have coherence and compatible rules and regulations 
across jurisdictions. 
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group approaches to capital allocation and risk management within cross-border banks.13 There 
is no area where divergence of national rules and regulations is more important than cross-border 
bank failures. Thus, protection of financial stability in an integrated financial market 
characterized by cross-border financial institutions becomes a very challenging task, especially 
when there are incongruent policy measures between national preferences and regional 
integration requirements. While, at the later stages of single market development the EU has 
moved very close to maximum harmonization in the field financial market regulation, the overall 
European regulatory edifice lacked strong uniformity/consistency both in terms of rule 
construction and rule enforcement in this area. In addition, there has been a marked absence of 
institutions that could provide binding guidance, in the event of difference of opinion between 
national regulators, as regards the application and enforcement of financial regulation, or could 
resolve eventual conflicts of national regulatory actions.  
The complexity of the financial integration process and its significance means that it is 
impossible to understand contemporary developments within the Eurozone without a discussion 
of the different forms of integration and of the history of financial integration in Europe. In the 
following paragraphs we provide a conceptual categorization of the different forms of integration 
and an historical account of the EU financial integration process. 
 
1.  Different forms of integration 
It is important to draw a distinction between economic, monetary and political forms of 
integration before looking at the specific properties of EU financial integration. Economic 
integration normally refers to integration of national commercial and economic policies and 
elimination of trade barriers and of obstacles to foreign direct investment (FDI).14 Monetary 
integration15 refers to formal currency alignments and interest rate cooperation between states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. 
Brussels: European Union. 
14 For Ropke, the free and reciprocal flow of trade between the various national economies’ is what 
defines economic integration. See, Ropke, W. (1950). 
15 Monetary arrangements that supplement trade relationships have existed for centuries. In the Eastern 
Roman Empire, for example, the solidus coin —a currency whose metallic content was stable—circulated 
widely for more than seven hundred years. Its predecessor the denarius was undermined by emperor 
Diocletian’s (284-305AD) debasing of the metal content of the coin to cover the penury of the Roman 
treasury at the time due to continuous defensive wars. This type of monetary arrangement was not a true 
	   9	  
On the other hand, financial sector integration refers to the elimination of restrictions to cross-
border capital flows that may involve transactions concerning loans, debt and equity securities, 
and of barriers to cross-border market access by financial intermediaries, as well as to rights of 
foreign firm establishment. The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is 
fully integrated if all potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics deal 
with a single set of rules, when they decide to transact in financial instruments and / or provide 
financial services, and firms and consumers have non-discriminatory access to such financial 
instruments and / or services. It must also provide non-discriminatory regulatory oversight 
arrangements.16 Finally, political integration is equally important. It involves the voluntary 
sharing/pooling of sovereignty, whether in commercial and financial affairs, trade-policy 
cooperation/co-ordination, or in relation to justice and national security.17 Thus, lack of political 
integration can hinder the flow of benefits emanating from monetary and financial integration. 
  
2.  Early Stages of European Financial Integration 
Financial integration in Europe is a much earlier than late 20th century phenomenon, at least for 
the leading European markets. There is convincing evidence, which shows that by the mid-
eighteenth century European equity markets were well integrated.18 Professor Neal, who 
explored the operation of the international capital market and links between Amsterdam and 
London in the early eighteenth century, has concluded that both markets were well integrated in 
the pre-World War I period (1870s to 1913). This was, in general, a period characterized by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
monetary union but rather a common-currency-standard area, because each country’s monetary policy 
was separately rooted in a commodity—such as gold or silver—and they did not involve establishment of 
a common monetary authority or currency. Thus, they can hardly compare with the EMU. See, Meade, E. 
E. (March 21, 2009). Monetary Integration. Rethinking Finance: Harvard International Review. 
http://hir.harvard.edu/rethinking-finance/monetary-integration 
16 See, Baele, L., Ferrando, A., Hördahl, P., Krylova, E., & Monnet, C. (April 2004). Measuring Financial 
Integration in the Euro Area. Occasional Paper Series No. 14: European Central Bank. P.7 
17 On the main tenets of political integration in an intergovernmentalist rational bargaining framework see 
A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1993), 473-524. 
18 Neal, L. (1985). Integration of international capital markets: quantitative evidence from the eighteenth 
to twentieth centuries. Journal of Economic History, 45, 219-226. Also, Neal, L. (1990). The rise of 
financial capitalism: international capital markets in the age of reason. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. Neal, L. (1992). The disintegration and re-integration of international capital markets in 
the 19th century. Business and Economic History, 2, 84-96. 
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transition from autarky to integrated world capital markets, and, thus, for many it constitutes the 
era of the first globalization.  The term ‘financial integration’ however, was not used in this sense 
before the mid-1950s. German neoliberals during the 1950s advocated international integration 
through removal of trade barriers and the introduction of free convertibility. Machlup associated 
financial integration with capital mobility.19 Ropke stated that multilateral trade and free 
convertibility was only ‘a different expression’ for international integration just as bilateralism 
and capital controls are another name for international disintegration of the economy. As this 
argument goes, the greater the degree of regional integration by multilateralism and 
convertibility, the larger are the advantages of economic cooperation.20 Yet evidence of the 
existence of a direct causal relationship between financial integration and economic growth 
remains inconclusive,21 as any economic growth benefits deriving from financial integration 
depend upon a number of preconditions necessary to facilitate the integration process.22  
When the six-state European Economic Community (EEC) was established, in 1957 (by 
the Treaty of Rome), furthering member states’ growth was the apparent but not sole objective of 
the founders. Political integration was a stronger long-term objective. Namely, building a single 
market was seen as an essential pre-requisite to political integration and not a self-standing goal. 
The fact that political integration in the EU is still nowhere close to what was envisaged by the 
founding fathers can easily explain the lack of adequate institutions supervising the single 
financial market and securing financial stability. For example, even one of the EU fundamental 
freedoms, the free movement of capital, became effective only after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, a full 35 years after the Treaty of Rome, as it was essential in building a 
European monetary union and national restrictions in the free flow of capital could  no longer be 
retained. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, Machlup, F. (1977). A History of Thought on Economic Integration. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
20 Ropke, W. (1950). The social crisis of our time. London: Hodge. See also, Dorn, J. A., & Xi, W. (Eds.). 
(1990). Economic reform in China: problems and prospects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P.120 
21 Liu, Q., Lejot, P., & Arner, D. A. (2013). Forthcoming (ch 12, page.513) 
22 Such integration pre-requisites include domestic institutional reforms, the maintenance of adequate and 
enforceable property rights, and adequate controls on money supply. See also, Dorn, J. A., & Xi, W. 
(Eds.). (1990). Economic reform in China: problems and prospects. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. P.121 
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B.  The Role of the EU Treaties: An Ever Closer Union?  
1.  The path towards economic integration and the monetary union 
The European economic integration process and the establishment of the Euro as the common 
currency of (as of today) seventeen EU member states has been incremental with periods of 
strong progress and of painfully slow growth. In general, it has been the product of political 
expediencies as much as of economic efficiency rationales and it has witnessed major crises and 
setbacks.23  
 Western European economies and Japan have shown in the post-war era a marked 
preference for exchange rate stability. When the first set of European arrangements aiming at 
exchange rate stability failed, following the collapse of the requisite Bretton Woods 
arrangements, and the post-war world entered the era of floating exchange rates, EEC members 
created the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979,24 in order to manage and control 
currency fluctuations among EMS members. EMS was viewed as the first step towards 
permanent exchange rate alignment and paved the way towards the establishment of European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Eventually, EMU member states irrevocably pegged the 
exchange rates of member country currencies, which were replaced by single European currency. 
At this point it should be noted that the establishment of the single currency was itself a 
matter of politics as much as of economic necessity. Of course, through a currency union, EU 
members could answer the classic monetary trilemma, which is built on the Mundell-Fleming 
model of an open economy under capital mobility.25 The monetary trilemma famously states that 
a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility, and national monetary policy cannot be achieved at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See P Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative 
Political Studies, 29 (1996), 123-63 and J. Story and I. Walter, Political Economy of Financial 
Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems (Manchester University Press, 1997). 
24 See, Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and related matters (1978) Bulletin of the European Communities. December, 
No 12, pp 9–13. Regulations Nos 380 and 381/78, 18 December 1978,OJEC, No L379, 30 December 
1978 (and their modifications); Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the Member 
States of the European Economic Community laid down the operating procedures for the European 
Monetary System. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/compendia/a791231en1771979compen
diumcm_a.pdf  See for analysis, Giavazzi, F., & Giovannini, A. (1989). See also, Marcello De Cecco, A. 
G. (Ed.). (1989). 
25 See, Mundell, R. A. (1963). Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates. Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 475-485 available at 
http://jrxy.zjgsu.edu.cn/jrxy/jssc/2904.pdf  
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same time; one policy objective has to give. Therefore, under capital mobility and national 
monetary policy, fixed exchange rates will invariably break down.26 However, as the EU has 
been very far from being an optimal currency area under the Mundell model,27 and there was no 
fiscal integration or debt mutualization it was only a matter of time before the first strains would 
appear. It is, thus, arguable that the founders of the EMU just hoped that a single currency would 
pave the way for a fiscal and political union, something that has not yet happened. Moreover the 
desire for a political union might not have been the whole story. 
From a political economy viewpoint European financial and monetary integration was 
not just an inter-governmental goal, or merely dictated by the conditions of increasing market 
integration and capital mobility in the EU. The interests of professional intermediaries may have 
also been a strong force behind the push for further integration. For example, the Eurobond and 
the Eurocurrency interbank markets were the markets that emerged as a result of national, legal 
and regulatory impediments to capital flows.28 Given an excess supply of petro-dollars in 
offshore markets, their scale began to rival national markets in banking and securities. This led to 
protracted negotiations in the early 1990s between industry representatives and regulators that 
brought off-shore activity back into national markets, while subsuming the many disparate local 
practices. In fact, the early Eurobond market might have played the role of an imperfect 
substitute to financial integration, given that capital mobility was only a secondary EU goal until 
the 1990s.29 Conversely, The 1966 Segré report was both very cognizant of the growth potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2005). The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs 
among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 
423-438. 
27 Mundell, R. A. (1961). A Theory of  Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review 51 (4): 
657–665 
28 See European Commission, The EU economy: 2003 review (Brussels: Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, (2003) No. 6 at 320, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ publications/publication7694_en.pdf>.  
 
29 Robert Genillard, “The Eurobond Market” (1967) 23:2 Financial Analysts J. 144. The article concludes 
that the Eurobond market was a “fine example of the benefits of international collaboration by bankers in 
a fully competitive climate.” See also Kurt Richebacher, “The Problems and Prospects of Integrating 
European Capital Markets” (1969) 1:3 J. Money, Credit & Banking 337.  
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attached to financial integration and of the potential for this objective to be confounded by 
commercial interests.30 
2.  EMU membership criteria and realities 
The path to monetary integration that was adopted by the Maastricht Treaty was based on a 
three-stage process and the fulfilment of convergence criteria. Only countries, which met the 
appropriate criteria, could gain Eurozone membership. The transitional framework under the 
treaty provided some flexibility in terms of the time required for the weaker candidate economies 
to converge with the strongest, especially as regards their macroeconomic outlooks and policies. 
However, such convergence proved in many cases no more than drawing board plans.  
The Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria includedtwo basic conditions for euro 
membership: firstly, a three percent limit on general government annual deficit and a sixty 
percent limit on general government gross debt limit.31 It also included three other important 
criteria, which were inflation, long-term interest rates, and exchange rate fluctuations. Inflation 
was to be kept within 1.5 percent margin over that of any of the three EU countries having the 
lowest inflation rate. Long-term interest rates were to stay within a 2 percent margin over that of 
the three states with the lowest borrowing rates in the European Union.  
As regards, exchange-rate fluctuations, there was a requirement of participation for two 
years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), which provided for a narrow band of 
exchange-rate fluctuations. The reality was, however, in glaring contrast with the spirit of the 
Treaty, due to political pressures and the actual condition of the European economies, which 
even in the 1990s were mildly to grossly indebted states with considerable budget deficits.  The 
Treaty itself had exceptions to provide political leverage in extending membership to certain 
countries while restricting it to others.32 Italy, the third largest economy in continental Europe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Claude Segré et al., The Development of a European Capital Market: Report of a Group of Experts 
appointed by the EEC Commission (Brussels: European Economic Community, 1966). Segré argued for 
harmonization of non-retail national markets in ways later encouraged by the Eurobond market. 
31 See article 104c of The Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities Protocols. (February 07, 1992).  Maastricht:  Retrieved from 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtprotocols.pdf. 
32 Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty stated that countries could exceed the 3 percent deficit target if 
‘the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference 
value’ or ‘excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to 
the reference value’. Euro area countries could similarly exceed the 60 percent gross debt target provided 
that ‘the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.’ See, 
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was running general government gross debt in 1998 at 114.9 percent of GDP (as against 60 
percent required by the Treaty), Belgium’s gross government debt (home to the EU capital, 
Brussels) was at 117.4 percent of GDP, and formation of a euro block was implausible without 
having both of these countries in the Eurozone. This makes visible a huge difference in the 
conditions of the European economies upon joining the Eurozone. In practice, these differences 
meant a much lesser degree of economic integration than had been envisaged in the earlier 
Werner (1970) and Delors reports (1989) respectively.33 Moreover, the difference in the 
macroeconomic ‘initial conditions’ of the founding member states made it politically difficult to 
enforce the strict fiscal criteria laid down for EMU membership. 
 
C.  EU harmonisation legislation 1985-2009: Market Impact, Gaps and Loopholes 
1.  Harmonisation principles 
Completion of the legal and regulatory framework has always been regarded as an essential 
prerequisite in the EU financial integration process. The first step towards this direction was to 
develop a harmonized set of minimum regulatory standards based on consensus.34 This seemed 
more aligned with the overall objective of achieving a single market without having to endure 
excessive concessions on idiosyncratic national policy designs and preferences, which might 
make the harmonisation process politically untenable.  
The Delors Commission’s 1985 White Paper35 preceded the enactment of the first 
amendment to the Treaty of Rome in 30 years, the so-called ‘Single European Act’.36 The White 
Paper outlined the reforms required in the pre-existing EEC legal framework in order to build a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Treaties Establishing the European Communities 
Protocols. (February 07, 1992).   
33 Under the Delors’ report, economic union and monetary union form two integral and equally important 
parts of a single whole and would therefore have to be implemented in parallel (Point 21 of the report) 
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf  However, the Delors’ report adopted a 
comparatively less centralized approach economic policy than the Werner report. 
34 This has been defined by one of us as the first EU financial services consensus. See Avgouleas, E 
(2005). The New EC Financial Markets Legislation and the Emerging Regime for Capital Markets. 
Yearbook of European Law, 2004, 321 -61. 
35 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the European Commission 
to the European Council, (1985) Com(85) 310 final. 
36 Single European Act [1987] O.J. L 169/1. 
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truly single market in the EEC (as it then was) and pave the way to monetary integration.37 The 
White Paper noted at the same time that: ‘the legislation adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament is either too detailed, or insufficiently adapted to local conditions and 
experience; often in stark contrast to the original proposals.’38 However, maximum 
harmonization proved impossible for many areas of activity in the single market and the 
European Commission adopted instead the principles of mutual recognition, minimum 
harmonisation, and home country control. The three principles were subsequently enshrined in 
harmonisation legislation in a number of areas, including financial services. The internal market 
was to be based on minimum harmonisation of national regulatory systems and mutual 
recognition39 through which member states would recognise each other’s laws, regulations, and 
authorities.40 Use of minimum regional requirements was intended to limit competitive 
deregulation by state actors and regulatory arbitrage by commercial parties.41 It was also a 
reflection of how political collaboration can encourage adoption of sound market principles and 
practices. 42  
The EU framework for financial services provided minimum standards for the 
establishment and operation of banks and other financial intermediaries, conduct of public offers 
on a national and pan-European basis, and extended to accounting, company law, and regulation 
of institutional investors, in the form of collective investments schemes. It also provided access 
to the single market unfettered by national borders or restrictions on activity, the so-called single 
passport facility.43 Essentially, the purpose of the passport facility was to allow intermediaries to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The Delors’ report provided for the establishment of a new monetary institution that would be called a 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) responsible to carry out monetary policy and the 
Community’s exchange rate policy vis-à-vis third currencies. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 B. Steil, The European Equity Markets: The State of the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1996). 
41 Arner, D. W., & Taylor, M. W. (2010). The Global Credit Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: 
Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation? University of New South Wales Law 
Journal, 32, 488-513. 
42 Arner, D. W., Lejot, P., & Wang, W. (2009). Assessing East Asian Financial Cooperation and 
Integration. Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, pp. 1-42, 2009. 
43 EU financial services directives addressed issues relating to regulation of banks and banking markets, 
investment services firms, collective investment schemes, life and non-life insurance, and pension 
funds.See, Cranston, R (ed.), The Single Market and the Law of Banking (Lloyds of London Press, 2nd 
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deliver products or services into any part of the internal market and promote cross-border 
competition.44 As a result, the ‘passport directives’ in financial services defined the kind of 
financial intermediary to which they applied, its activities and the market segment, the conditions 
for initial and continuing authorizations, the division of regulatory responsibility between the 
home (domicile) state and the host state, and aspects of the regulatory treatment of non-EU 
member states.45 Authorized financial intermediaries that came within the ambit of one of the 
‘passport directives’ could, on the basis of the home country license, offer banking and 
investment services on a cross-border basis, without maintaining a permanent presence in the 
target market, or through a foreign branch.46 The home state would generally be responsible for 
the licensing and supervision of financial intermediaries, for their foreign branches, and for the 
fitness and propriety of managers and major shareholders. The host state would be responsible 
for conduct within their jurisdiction or in the course of offering services cross-border to clients 
residing within their jurisdiction. 
The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union as a successor to the EEC, 
provided an impetus for states to implement prior financial services directives and led to 
members other than Ireland and the United Kingdom adopting legislation that was often foreign 
to their traditional market practices. One important influence in the success of the harmonization 
mechanisms adopted at this stage of EU integration process was the role played by the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Being part of the EU obligated its member states to adopt 
and implement EU legislation, as national governments could be held liable in damages for 
failing to comply with EU-level decisions.47 
  
2.  The gradual shift to maximum harmonisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ed., 1995); Ferrarini, G, 1998. European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and 
Beyond (Kluwer Law, 1998). 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
46 A good discussion of the ambit of the provisions for investment firms may be found in Moloney, N. 
(2008). EC Securities Regulation (Oxford, 2nd edition, 2008), pp.379-460. 
47 Judgment of the Court of 19 November 1991. - Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v 
Italian Republic. - References for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di Vicenza and Pretura di Bassano del 
Grappa - Italy. - Failure to implement a directive - Liability of the Member State. - Joined cases C-6/90 
and C-9/90. European Court reports 1991 Page I-05357. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61990J0006:EN:HTML 
	   17	  
The ‘passport directives’ have clearly enhanced financial integration in the EU, although areas of 
marked divergence, such as retail financial services, remained.48 But, minimum harmonization 
left the EU with an incomplete regulatory framework, since, in many cases, it merely augmented 
rather than replaced pre-existing national laws.49 Thus, the drive towards harmonization 
intensified in the early 2000s, following the introduction of the Euro and the publication of the 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999.50 Arguably, the most important 
integrative instrument of that era (which can be viewed as the second EU financial services 
consensus)51 was the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), which established 
a detailed pan-European regime with respect to conditions of establishment and operation of 
financial markets and investment intermediaries and the conduct of cross-border financial 
activities.52 National implementation of MiFID from 2007 onwards represented the third stage of 
single market development.53  
To answer a number of challenges pertaining mostly to enactment and consistent 
implementation of financial services legislation, the EU adopted the so-called Lamfalussy 
process in 2001. It consisted of four levels that started with the adoption of the framework 
legislation (Level 1) and more detailed implementing measures (Level 2). For the technical 
preparation of the implementing measures, the Commission was to be advised by the committees 
made up of representatives of national supervisory bodies from three sectors: banking, insurance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 E. Grossman and P. Leblond, “European Financial Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward?,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (2011), 413-35. 
49 See for a discussion of this issue and the gaps left behind by minimum harmonization Avgouleas, E 
(2000).  The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, 
Subsidiarity and Investor Protection. European Law Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 72-92. 
50 Commission Communication, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: 
Action Plan, COM(1999)232. On the important changes FSAP implemented in the field of EU regulation 
of financial services and its impact on the single market see Ferran, E. (2005). Building an EU Securities 
Market (CUP, 2005).  
51 On this and for a critical discussion of FSAP legislation see See Avgouleas, E (2005). Evaluation of the 
New EC Financial Market Regulation: Peaks and Troughs in the Road Ahead. Transnational Lawyer Vol. 
18, pp. 179-228. 
52 EC, Directive 2004/39/EC 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 
[2007] O.J. L 145/1. For a discussion of the contours of MiFID see Avgouleas, E (ed.), The Regulation of 
Investment Services in Europe under MiFiD: Implementation and Practice (Tottel, 2008). 
53 Mads Andenas, Douglas Arner & Mei-wah Leung, “The Future of the European Single Market for 
Financial Services” AIIFL Working Paper No. 8, online: http:www.aiifl.com.  
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and occupational pensions, and the securities markets. These committees were CEBS,54 
CEIOPS55 and CESR56. The level 3 committees would then contribute to the consistent 
implementation of Community directives in the Member States, ensuring effective cooperation 
between the supervisory authorities and convergence of their practices (Level 3) and finally, the 
Commission was to enforce timely and correct transposition of EU legislation into national laws 
(Level 4).57  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the EU has introduced a number of pan-
European bodies with regulatory competences, the most important of which is the development 
of a common rulebook.58 The new institutions that the EU has built since 2009 are discussed in 
section III.B. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory group on 
banking supervision in the European Union was established by the European Commission in 2004 by 
Decision 2004/5/EC (the Commission’s decision dated November 2003 is available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_banki
ng/l22025_en.htm) On 1 January 2011, this committee was replaced by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), which took over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 available 
at:http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b  
55 CEIOPS (2003-2010) was established under the European Commission's Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003. In January 2011 CEIOPS was replaced by EIOPA under the Decision 2009/79/EC in 
accordance with the new European financial supervision framework. 
56 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was an independent committee of European 
Securities regulators established by European Commission on June 6 of 2001. On 1 January 2011, CESR 
was replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in accordance with the new 
European financial supervision framework. See more at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= 
57 See, Lamfalussy, A. (2001). Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets Brussels, 15 February 2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf. 
For a review on the process recommendations, see also, Ferran, E. (2010). Understanding the New 
Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision. In G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt & E.Wymeersch 
(Eds.), Rethinking Financial Regulation and Supervision in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2012), Ch. 5, where 
Ferran examines the recent EU institutional reforms on financial market supervision to assess their 
significance. See also, Schaub, A. (2004). The Lamfalussy process four years on. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 13(2), 110 - 120. 
58 See ‘Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’, February 2009 (the de 
Larosière report), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
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III.  Crisis and Response in the EU 
A. The GFC and Eurozone debt crisis 
1.  Overview 
As mentioned earlier, it was not until the 2008 crisis and in earnest after the outbreak of the 
Eurozone debt crisis in 2010 that the vexed issue of preservation of financial stability in an 
integrated market came to the forefront of EU policy-makers’ attention.  Both crises have 
emphasized the need to revisit existing models of financial market integration with a view of 
enriching them with institutions and structures that underpin financial stability as well as 
economic growth. It should be noted here that the Maastricht Treaty (1992) did not include 
‘financial stability’ as a key objective of the ECB, although, article 127(5) of TFEU underscores 
the ‘financial stability’ as a classic central banking good. Thus, financial stability has not been 
designed as one of the four basic tasks to be carried through the ESCB (article 127(2) of TFEU) 
and has rather been clustered with prudential supervision under the ‘non-binding tasks’ of the 
ECB. 	  
Until the onset of the GFC in 2008, the ‘common passport facility’ was at the heart of the 
EU single market. The EU legislative framework based on harmonized standards for financial 
markets sought equivalence among disparate regulatory and legal systems, so that regional 
initiatives could recognise national legal and regulatory regimes.59 But a multi-level governance 
system involves far more complexities than a regime based on minimum harmonisation can 
foresee. These mainly arise out of the conflicting and sometimes misunderstood national 
priorities and transnational requirements. Even before the current crisis, the European Union was 
viewed by some as a ‘too intrusive’ and ‘remote’ institution in need of a more coherent set of 
policies within existing treaties.60  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See, B Steil, The European Equity Markets: The State of the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 113 
60 COM. (2001). European Governance - A White Paper.  Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities. P12 
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Political considerations also undermined the credibility of rule-based frameworks for 
coordination of national fiscal policies in the euro area.61 For example, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) was originally designed to safeguard sound public finances and to thwart individual 
Eurozone members from adopting fiscal policies leading to unsustainable debt levels by 
enforcing budgetary discipline. Nonetheless, France and Germany, faced with a breach of the 3 
percent deficit limit in 2002-04, pushed through a watering down of the SGP rules by March 
2005. Arguably, the Maastricht Treaty itself allowed sufficient flexibility to the interpretation of 
SGP and its enforcement as to allow it to become part of the political bargaining process in the 
EU at the expense of objective economic criteria.62 As a result, during the period that the debt 
crisis was building up, the Eurozone was deeply marked by economic and financial imbalances 
and the Union itself lacked a central fiscal authority, which would have afforded it a credible 
mechanism to enforce budget discipline. In addition, trade imbalances due to accelerating 
competitiveness imbalances and lack of exchange rate flexibility meant that there were no 
realistic prospects for fiscal convergence.63 Yet, preserving, in the long-term, any currency 
union, including the EMU, requires a sufficient level of economic convergence, together with a 
properly functioning internal market, and an effective system for economic and budgetary policy 
surveillance and coordination.  
 Accordingly, when the GFC broke out with force, European financial stability was 
hampered by a number of pre-existing problems which had simply been ignored for far too long. 
These included colossal pre-crisis public and private debt piles, a flawed macroeconomic 
framework, and absence of institutions capable of handling effectively a cross-border banking 
crisis. The incomplete institutional design was the true mark of an ‘imbalanced’ and disjointed 
monetary union, also characterized by the absence of effective fiscal convergence mechanisms. 
Namely, during the first decade of its life, the EMU was premised on a weak institutional 
framework that was more suitable to a ‘fair weather currency’,64 rather than a monetary union 
with asymmetrical member economies, which were about to experience massive macro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See, Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). The coming resolution of the European crisis 
[electronic resource] Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C   Retrieved from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/iie/0024277/f_0024277_19801.pdf 
62European Council Presidency Conclusions, Council of the European Union. (March 22-23, 2005).  
Brussels:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/84335.pdf. 
63 See P. de Grawe, Economics of Monetary Union (OUP, 9th ed., 2012), part 2. 
64 Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). Ibid 
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economic shocks. It assumed that any macroeconomic or banking system stability shocks could 
be dealt with at the national level without requiring any transfers from the strongest to the 
weaker members of the Eurozone, due to the no bailout clause in the EMU Treaty.65 
Consequently, the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in 2010 meant that the 
EU had to enter into the most transformative phase of its history.   
While the 2008 crisis intensified reform efforts to a great extent, the true big bang for the 
mooted pan-European supervisory and bank resolution structures has been the ensuing Eurozone 
debt crisis, which has shaken to its foundations the banking system of the eurozone. The EU had 
to devise mechanisms, in the midst of crisis, firstly, to prevent an immediate meltdown of its 
banking sector and ensuing chain of sovereign bankruptcies and, secondly, to reform its flawed 
institutions, in order to prevent the Eurozone architecture from collapsing. Namely, Eurozone 
members had to build both a crisis-fighting capacity and support bailout funding mechanisms. 
This has led to the establishment of a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which will be 
superseded by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  At the same time, serious steps have 
been taken to build a European Banking Union based on structures safeguarding centralization of 
bank supervision and uniform deposit insurance arrangements, as well as centralization of crisis-
resolution.  
 
2.  Problems of Integration – Cross-border banking 
The premise of home-country control and the principle of minimum harmonization were bound 
to undermine at some point the stability of the EU banking system. The integration process 
continued in an increasingly de-regulated market following the intensification of liberalization 
efforts in the last quarter of the 20th century, but the regulatory standards and supervisory 
principles were not adjusted to new realities. The Eurozone crisis has brought home with 
devastating force the potential risks of financial market integration, which inevitably leads 
financial institutions operating in the single market to develop very tight links of 
interconnectedness, allowing thus shocks appearing in one part of the market to be transmitted 
widely and quickly across all other parts. Examples of such rapid transmission of shocks include 
the failure of Icelandic banks, the botched rescue of Fortis bank, the threat of collapse of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See Art. 101 TEU (now enshrined in Art. 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2008). 
	   22	  
financial systems of Ireland and Spain, and the possibility of a sovereign default (e.g., Greece), 
or of a chain of sovereign defaults. Each of those crises brought serious tremors to European 
markets and exposed their fragility and the dearth of policy options available to Eurozone 
decision-makers. Naturally, the rapid amplification of those crises and their grave consequences 
has raised serious questions regarding the survival of Eurozone.  
In the US the response to the crisis was rapid and came in the form of state purchase of 
distressed bank assets so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP), innovative 
intervention schemes by the Federal Reserve, and (complex) re-regulation of the financial sector. 
In the EU however, the diversity of member state economies and issues arising out of inherent 
contradictions between national policy priorities meant a much lower degree of responsiveness to 
the crisis. This became evident as soon as some of the EMU states, which experienced a more 
severe crisis than other members had to adopt policies based on their own national needs and 
interests – which may not be necessarily have been in conformity with single market policies. 
For example, lack of common deposit insurance in a well-integrated banking market at a time of 
cross-border crisis led to several conflicting policy choices and responses in an effort by the 
states to protect their own citizens.  
 
a. The Icelandic banking crisis 
The collapse of the Icelandic banks - Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki66 – which operated 
branches in EU member states on the basis of the single passport presents a classic case of home 
country control failure and of the disastrous consequences of lack of centralized supervision and 
resolution mechanisms in the EU. Iceland’s banks expanded in the 2000s in a way that exceeded 
the small country’s GDP by a massive 6:1 ratio. The single passport, also afforded to European 
Economic Area countries (such as Iceland, which is not an EU member), gave Icelandic banks 
the ability to expand their assets and deposit base through branches and through internet-based 
operations offering cross-border banking services. As European depositors were lured by the 
high interest rates offered by Icelandic banks, gradually Icelandic banks built a large depositor 
base in certain European countries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The collapse followed from difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt and a run on deposits in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
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However, by 2008 both the country’s economy and even more its banks were in serious 
trouble. While trouble was brewing over several months Icelandic bank operations within the EU 
were supervised by the home country authorities, which were unwilling to take any radical 
restructuring or rescue measures, thus, nothing was done to prevent the ensuing panic. So when 
Icelandic banks faced difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt, a run on the Icelandic 
bank’s deposits in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom became inevitable, as domestic 
depositors were not covered by the deposit protection scheme of their home countries. While 
both the Netherlands and the UK, were, in the beginning unwilling to extend protection to 
Icelandic bank depositors, at the same time, Iceland could provide no comfort to foreign 
depositors, because it was already in the middle of a deep financial crisis, and its government did 
not want to pay for the mistakes made by private banks with the assistance of politicians and of 
‘home’ supervisory authorities. Harsh responses followed both from the UK and Netherlands 
authorities,67 which, though entirely necessary, annulled the single passport principle. In order to 
prevent the crisis spreading to the British banking system the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown 
extended protection to British depositors, which essentially meant that the British deposit 
protection scheme would cover the loss. Thus, the UK Treasury proceeded with the 
unprecedented step of issuing a compulsory freezing order of Icelandic bank assets and deposits 
under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which, of course, antagonized 
relationships with Iceland. In addition, the UK government announced that it would launch legal 
action against Iceland over any losses connected to the compensation of an estimated 300,000 
UK savers.68 Icelandic authorities later reached an agreement separately with both the UK and 
the government of the Netherlands. Thus, Iceland will be paying the UK and Netherlands a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The UK used provisions in sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 to issues a freezing order over Landsbanki assets.  The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008 was 
passed at 10 am on 8 October 2008 and came into force ten minutes later. Under the order the UK 
Treasury froze the assets of Landsbanki within the UK, to prevent the sale or movement of Landsbanki 
assets within the UK, even if held by the Central Bank of Iceland or the Government of Iceland. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2%80%932012_Icelandic_financial_crisis - cite_note-55 See, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, retrieved, November 24, 2012 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents. 
68 Marshall, Chris; Martin, Iain (October 08, 2008). “UK government launching legal action against 
Iceland.”http://www.citywire.co.uk/money/update-uk-govt-launching-legal-action-against-
iceland/a316803, retrieved on November 24, 2011 
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percentage of GDP from 2019-23 to compensate for the deposit protection made available by 
these two countries to their own consumers holding deposits in Icelandic banks. 
The collapse of Icelandic banks led to economic crisis and the mishandling of the crisis 
brought down the political machinery of the government. In fact, it seems that requisite 
malpractice involved abuse of insiders’ positions (especially in the case of Kaupthing bank, 
where in a way the bank was buying its own shares)69 and weak supervisory and institutional 
oversight. Moreover, the Icelandic banking crisis and the more recent Cyprus banking crisis hold 
serious lessons for Asian countries as they underscore the risks arising from the ‘nurturing’ of 
over-grown financial sectors which much outstrip a country’s GDP, although this irrefutable 
does place smaller country industries into a disadvantageous competitive position.70  
 
b. The botched rescue of Fortis Bank 
When the collapse of Lehman Brothers hit global markets, Fortis -- a big European bank with 
strong cross-border presence in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg -- came very 
close to collapse.71  In Belgium, Fortis was the country's biggest private sector employer and 
more than 1.5 million households -- about half the country -- banked with the group. In 2007, 
Fortis had acquired parts of ABN AMRO through a consortium with Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Santander. In 2008, Fortis had difficulties realising its plans to strengthen its financial position. 
Over the summer of 2008, its share price deteriorated and liquidity became a serious concern. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The investigation is expected to focus on a number of questionable financial practices engaged in by 
Icelandic banks including the following:  (a). Almost half of all the loans made by Icelandic banks were 
to holdings companies, many of which are connected to those same Icelandic banks. (b). Money was 
allegedly lent by the banks to their employees and associates so they could buy shares in the banks while 
simply using the same shares as collateral for the loans. Borrowers were then allowed to defer paying 
interest on the loan until the end of the period, when the whole amount plus interest accrued was due. 
These same loans were then allegedly written off days before the banks collapsed. (c). Kaupthing allowed 
a Qatari investor to purchase 5% of its shares. It was later revealed that the Qatari investor “bought” the 
stake using a loan from Kaupthing itself and a holding company associated with one of its employees. 
See, Liu, Q., Lejot, P., & Arner, D. A. (2013), forthcoming 
70 Another lesson that the Icelandic banks crisis might hold is that default in the face of mounting and 
unreasonable debt might not be such a bad thing. By mid-2012 Iceland is regarded as one of Europe's 
recovery success stories. It has had two years of economic growth. Unemployment is down to 6.3% and 
Iceland is attracting immigrants to fill jobs. 
71 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border 
Bank Resolution Group’, Basel, September 2009, p. 10. 
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Insolvency fears saw Fortis’ shares to fall to their lowest level in more than a decade and its 
shares gradually lost more than three-quarters of their value.  
Fortis was deemed to be systemically relevant in the three countries. Thus, the ECB and 
ministers from the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to put 11.2bn euros ($16.1bn; 
£8.9bn) into Fortis to save the bank. As part of the weekend deal to rescue Fortis, the bank would 
have to sell its stake in the Dutch bank ABN Amro, which it had partially taken over the 
previous year. The Fortis deal would have seen Belgium contribute 4.7bn euros, the Netherlands 
4bn euros and Luxembourg 2.5bn euros. However, European bank shares fell sharply on worries 
that other banks could have problems, and on concerns over the 700bn dollars bailout plan in the 
United States (TARP). One of the biggest casualties was Fortis' rival Dexia, which French and 
Belgian governments also promised to step in to support. Eventually the joint rescue of Fortis 
broke down along national lines and each of the three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg) concentrated only on the part of the group that was most important for their 
market,72 in defiance of single market principles/ideals. 
 
3.  The Eurozone debt crisis 
In Europe, the banking and liquidity crisis soon transformed into a complex and multilayered 
crisis. As soon as a series of public bailouts took the issue of the continuing solvency of UK, US, 
and major European banks out of the limelight, the state of Irish and Spanish banks and the 
possibility of a Greek default brought the lurking woes of the Eurozone into sharp focus. Ireland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 (Emphasis added). The Dutch government purchased Fortis Bank Netherlands, Fortis Insurance 
Netherlands, Fortis Corporate Insurance and the Fortis share in ABN AMRO. The Belgian government 
raised its holding in Fortis Bank Belgium up to 99%. ‘The Belgian government also agreed to sell a 75% 
interest to BNP Paribas (BNP) in return for new BNP shares, keeping a blocking minority of 25% of the 
capital of Fortis Bank Belgium. BNP also bought the Belgian insurance activities of Fortis and took a 
majority stake in Fortis Bank Luxembourg. A portfolio of structured products was transferred to a 
financial structure owned by the Belgian State, BNP and Fortis Group.’ BCBS, Report and 
Recommendations, p. 10. On 12 December 2008, the Court of Appeal of Brussels suspended the sale to 
BNP, which was not yet finalised, and decided that the finalised sales to the Dutch State and to the 
Belgian State as well as the subsequent sale to BNP had to be submitted for approval by the shareholders 
of Fortis Holding in order for these three sales to be valid under Belgian Law. After initial rejection by the 
shareholders, certain transactions were renegotiated and financing of the portfolio of structured products 
was modified. The renegotiated transaction with the Belgian State and BNP was approved at the second 
general meeting of shareholders and the latter transaction was finalised on 12 May 2009. Ibid. 
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and Greece have essentially triggered the second and more lethal wave of the crisis of confidence 
that has hit most of Europe since 2010 - although Italy and Spain might in the end prove much 
bigger threats to Eurozone’s survival than Greece, Portugal and Ireland, which represent only a 
very small faction of Eurozone GDP. The Eurozone crisis should be be seen as a sequence of 
four interlocking crises resulting from imbalanced monetary integration. This resulted in a 
competitiveness crisis that transformed into a marked loss of fiscal revenues and widening fiscal 
deficits which led to debt accumulations (particularly in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that 
were financed by the surpluses of the northern countries, reflecting, in turn, to massive payment 
imbalances within the Eurozone (in particular, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland vis-à-vis 
the European South). As said surpluses had to be re-invested, they found their way to 
investments in the bonds of deficit countries (Greece, Italy) or to the banking systems of the 
Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Spain) and financed gigantic real estate bubbles in Ireland and 
Spain. Thus, they led to accumulation of unsustainable levels of public or private debt or both.73 
 Eurozone economies continue to suffer from the impact: the sharp recessions of 2008-09 
and subsequent economic slowdowns coupled with sovereign debt crises have had a sharply 
negative impact on their fiscal position which has been further aggravated by the operation of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and the counter-cyclical fiscal measures adopted during the crisis. 
The EU-wide general government deficit has increased from 1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 6.8 
percent of GDP in 2009. At the same time, the Eurozone’s74 aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio also 
deteriorated markedly, rising from 61.8 percent of GDP by 2007 to a projected 82.3 percent in 
2011 to 90.0 percent of GDP by the second quarter of 2012, whereas for the EU-27,75 the ratio 
stood at 84.9 percent of GDP at the end of same period.76 The European Commission’s long-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Avgouleas, E. (July 2012). Eurozone Crisis and Sovereign Debt restructuring: Intellectual Fallacies and 
New Lines of Research. Paper presented at the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), 3rd 
Biennial Global Conference, Centre for International Law (CIL) and Faculty of Law, at National 
University of Singapore. 
74 The euro area (EA17) includes Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. 
75 The EU27 includes EA 17 plus Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom  
76 Euro area government debt up to 90.0% of GDP. (2012) Eurostat News Release: Euroindicators (Vol. 
150/2012-24October). Eurostar Press office, retrieved from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-24102012-AP/EN/2-24102012-AP-EN.PDF. 
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term projections indicate that debt-to-GDP ratio could rise to around 110 percent by 2030 in the 
absence of appropriate fiscal consolidation plans.77  
Following the escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in the second half of 2011, the EU 
economy entered a shallow recession by the fourth quarter of the same year. Since then, the 
outlook for the EU economy slowly improved in the beginning but the situation became 
extraordinarily fragile and by mid-2012 the risk of a renewed crisis became more evident. The 
intensification of the sovereign-debt crisis in the first half of the year, raised market concerns 
about the long-term viability of the euro area itself and the negative fall-out from banks' funding 
pressures and economic activity, together with an unexpected slowdown in non-EU GDP growth 
and global trade contributed to an overall disappointing global growth performance. The annual 
GDP growth rate predicted is 0.5 percent for the EU in 2013, whereas GDP in the Eurozone will 
remain unchanged.78 The weak short-term growth outlook raises concerns for the labour markets, 
where a further rise in already very high unemployment rates appears likely for this year as Italy, 
Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain implement austerity measures to reduce their debt 
through asset sales and reduced spending in social welfare programs. 
The Eurozone crisis has signaled a fundamental shift in the political dynamics 
underpinning the EU. While the exact remedies of the crisis, austerity, more integration, 
mutualization of Eurozone members’ debt and other measures remain the topic of heated 
discussion, one remedy is viewed as uncontroversial. Namely, it is quite beyond dispute that the 
Eurozone crisis would have been much less severe, if Eurozone members could find a way to 
break up the link between bank debt and sovereign indebtedness, which, of course, created a 
vicious circle of ever more bank bailouts and ever-higher levels of national debt. The fact that 
many EU banks had invested in EU members’ bonds and are also adversely affected by the 
continuous recession ravaging the periphery of the Eurozone has only made things worse. 
However, the EMU, although it had interest rate setting competence through the European 
Central Bank, has until recently been devoid of any binding mechanism to effectively enforce 
fiscal and banking stability, both areas of serious national interest where pooling of sovereignty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Arroyo, H. T. (2011). The EU’s Fiscal Crisis and Policy Response: reforming economic governance in 
the EU Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgetingandpublicexpenditures/48871475.pdf 
78 EU. (Autumn 2012). European Economic Forecast (Vol. European Economy: 7|2012). European 
Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
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was regarded, until recently, as intolerable. Namely, since its establishment the EMU lacked 
these crucial supporting institutions that could have helped it to restore financial stability during 
times of acute uncertainty and market volatility.79 More specifically, the EMU lacked suitable 
institutions that could absorb liquidity shocks, due to a collapse of confidence in the prospects of 
a member state’s economy, and cross-border supervisory and resolution structures that could 
effectively deal with the cross-border spillover effects of a bank collapse.  
In order to break the vicious circle between bank bailouts and levels of sovereign 
indebtedness, the Eurozone members have established a funding facility, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which, subject to a strict conditionality, will be employed to directly 
recapitalize Eurozone banks. The use of ESM funds for such recapitalisations would put to a stop 
to further increases of the indebtedness of the sovereign concerned due to bank bailouts. The 
inevitable transfer of payments from the richer to the weaker Eurozone members through the 
ESM, which enjoys the guarantee of all Eurozone members, and the need to tighten the 
framework for bank regulation, supervision, and resolution have meant that the countries in the 
core of the Eurozone have promoted the centralization of bank supervision and resolution 
functions in the EMU. These demands have given birth to a new set of bank authorization, 
supervision and resolution arrangements: the European Banking Union. However, the European 
Banking Union, plausible and necessary as it may be, has also reinforced rather than calmed the 
centrifugal forces within the EU and has the potential to lead to a serious split of the internal 
market.80 Important members of the EU, chiefly the UK, have resolutely remained outside 
important European Banking Union arrangements. It is, thus, reasonable to infer that political 
expediency, and not economic necessities, will, in the end seal the fate of the single currency.  
 
B.  EU Financial Regulation Infrastructure in the post- 2009 period: From Evolution to 
Revolution 
1.  Phase I: From the Lamfalussy Process to the ESFS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). The coming resolution of the European crisis [electronic 
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80 Lastra, R. (2013).  Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?, Fordham 
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In November 2008 the Commission appointed a High Level Group (chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiere) to study the Lamfalussy framework in light of the GFC and the threats to cross-border 
banking and the internal market that the GFC uncovered, and to make recommendations for a 
new EU regulatory set up.81 The proposals advanced by the de Larosière report were 
instrumental to subsequent developments. In order to implement the recommendations of the de 
Larosiere committee the EU established (through a series of Regulations, normally referred to as 
the ESAs founding Regulations) an integrated European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), which came into effect in December 2010.82 It comprises the European Systemic Risk 
Board83 and a decentralized network comprising existing national supervisors (who would 
continue to carry out day-to-day supervision) and three new European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs): the European Banking Authority (EBA),84 the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), which 
respectively replaced the corresponding Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees: CEBS,85 CEIOPS86 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. 
Brussels: European Union. 
82 Article 2, ESA founding Regulations, see, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/77/EC. (2010) (pp. 84-119): Official Journal of the European Union, available at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/Reg_716_2010_ESMA.pdf.  
83 The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), established on 16 December 2010 in response to the 
ongoing financial crisis. It has been tasked with the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 
within the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial 
stability in the Union. It was established under the EU Regulation No 1092/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24/11/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (the ‘ESRB Regulation’). The 
Regulation is available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-
en.pdf?efba86ec695eea33d6b673acc62578d9  
84 The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 available 
at:http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b 
85 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory group on 
banking supervision in the European Union was established by the European Commission in 2004 by 
Decision 2004/5/EC (the Commission’s decision dated November 2003 is available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_banki
ng/l22025_en.htm) On 1 January 2011, this committee was succeeded by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), which took over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).  
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and CESR.87 Furthermore, colleges of supervisors88 were to be put in place for all major cross-
border institutions because supervision of strategic decisions at the consolidated level requires a 
college of supervisors to understand the global effects and externalities of those decisions.89 Last 
but not least, a Joint Committee90 was formed by the European Supervisory Authorities to 
coordinate their actions on cross-sectoral rule-making and supervisory matters. It was envisaged 
that in addition to the competences previously exercised by the Level 3 committees, the ESAs 
should have, inter alia, the following key competences91: 
i) Legally binding mediation between national supervisors, 
ii) Adoption of binding supervisory standards, 
iii) Adoption of binding technical decisions applicable to individual financial institutions, 
iv) Oversight and coordination of colleges of supervisors, 
v) Designation, where needed, of group supervisors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 CEIOPS (2003-2010) was established under the European Commission's Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003, which has been replaced by EIOPA. 
87 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was an independent committee of European 
Securities regulators established by European Commission on June 6 of 2001. On 1 January 2011, CESR 
was replaced by the ESMA.  
88 The colleges are a mechanism for the exchange of information between home and host authorities, for 
the planning and performance of key supervisory tasks in a coordinated manner or jointly, including all 
aspects of ongoing supervision, and also for the preparation for and the handling of emergency situations.. 
These are permanent, although flexible, structures for cooperation and coordination among the EU 
authorities responsible for and involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-border 
groups, specifically large groups. See further at http://www.eba.europa.eu/Supervisory-
Colleges/Introduction.aspx and, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles. (January 27, 2009) 
(Vol. CEIOPS-SEC-54/08, CEBS 2008 124, IWCFC 08 32): http://eba.europa.eu/getdoc/aeecaf1a-81b5-
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89 In a sense this followed similar propositions as to how regulation of corss-border banking in the EU had 
to be structured. See, Lamanda, C. (March 2009). Cross-Border Banking in Europe: what regulation and 
supervision? Unicredit Group Forum on Financial Cross-border Groups, Discussion paper No 01, 
available at https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/content/dam/unicreditgroup/documents/inc/press-and-
media/cross_border_banking_discussion_paper.pdf. Lamanda’s Report had suggested that the 
supervision of cross-border banks had to be based on three tiers: day-to-day supervision to continue with 
national supervisors as it requires supervisors to be close to a business; strategic decisions, affecting the 
entire group to be supervised by colleges of supervisors, with enhanced, legally binding supervisory 
powers for each cross-border institution; and, a European Banking Authority (EBA), whose 
independence, governance and mechanisms follow the proposal of the de Larosiere Group. 
90  
91 For comprehensive analysis, see Avgouleas, E. (2012). Governance of Global Financial Markets: the 
law, the economics, the politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
	   31	  
vi) Licensing and supervision of specific EU-wide institutions (e.g. Credit Rating 
Agencies, and post-trading infrastructures), and 
vii) Binding cooperation with the ESRC to ensure adequate macro-prudential supervision. 
 
ESAs’ work with the newly established European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to ensure 
financial stability and to strengthen and enhance the EU supervisory framework. Apart from 
issuing guidance and recommendations to national supervisors,92 ESAs also seek to formulate a 
single EU rulebook and harmonise technical standards on the basis of powers conferred by the 
EU commission,93 which subsequently will be adopted by the European Commission to become 
formal/binding EU law.94 To safeguard consistent application of harmonized legislation, if the 
ESAs find a national supervisory authority failing to apply EU law, they have the power to 
investigate infractions, with the relevant Authority having the power to directly issue 
recommendations to national supervisors to remedy potential infractions, followed by a formal 
opinion from the Commission (if the recommendation is not acted upon). If the supervisor does 
not comply with the Commission’s formal opinion, the ESA may then take decisions directly 
binding on firms or market participants concerned to ensure that they comply with EU law. In 
adverse situations, ESAs have wider-ranging powers.95 In a crisis, the ESAs will provide EU-
wide coordination.96 If an emergency is declared, the ESAs may make decisions that are binding 
on national supervisors and on firms. The ESAs will mediate in certain situations where national 
supervisory authorities disagree. If necessary, they will be able to resolve disputes by making a 
decision that is binding on both of the parties to ensure compliance with EU law.97 They have a 
role in EU supervisory colleges to ensure that they function efficiently and that consistent 
approaches and practices are followed.98 The ESAs will conduct regular peer reviews of national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Article 8, defining tasks and powers of the Authority; See also, Article 10-17, ESA founding 
Regulations. 
93 Article 11, exercise of delegation, ESA founding Regulations. 
94 Article 10, Regulatory Technical Standards, ESA founding Regulation. 
95 Article 18, Action in emergency situations, ESA founding Regulations. 
96 Article 31, Coordination function, ESA founding Regulations. 
97 Article 19, Settlement of disagreements between competent authorities in cross-border situations, and 
also, Article 20, Settlement of disagreements between competent authorities across sectors; Article 21, 
Colleges of supervisors, ESA founding regulations. 
98 Article 29, Common supervisory culture; Article 27, European system of resolution and funding 
arrangements, ESA founding Regulations. 
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supervisory authorities across the EU.99 They will be able to collect information from national 
supervisors to allow them to fulfill their role.100 This information will be used for analyzing 
market developments, coordinating EU-wide stress tests and the macro prudential analysis 
undertaken by the ESRB.101 They also have a remit to consider consumer protection issues.102 In 
the ensuing paragraphs we provided a more analytical overview of the competences discharged 
by the ESRB and the ESAs. 
  
a. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
One of the recommendations of the de Larosiere report was to take stock of systemic risk factors 
that have been affecting the stability of the EU financial system as a whole. This made necessary 
the establishment of a EU-level body tasked with macro-prudential risk assessment. On 16 
December 2010, Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 established a European Systemic Risk Board 
(the ESRB Regulation) as an independent body with no legal personality and with no legally 
binding powers, hosted by the ECB, which directs its work and chairs the meetings. The ESRB 
might, in fact, be the most pertinent of EU reforms in the East Asian context, given that the level 
of integration and harmonization of financial sector regulations lags considerably behind that of 
the EU.  
The ESRB aims at detection of excessive risk accumulation, improving surveillance and 
supervision. Thus, its principal task is to conduct operations consisting of prediction, assessment 
management, and prevention and control of systemic risk and to collect and analyze all the 
relevant and necessary information, identify and prioritize systemic risks,103 issue warnings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Article 30, Peer reviews of competent authorities, ESA founding Regulations. 
100 Article 36, Relationship with the ESRB, ESA founding Regulations. 
101 Article 36, Relationship with the ESRB, and, Article 23 Identification and measurement of systemic 
risk, ESA founding Regulations. See also Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. (2010) Official Journal of the European Union 
(Vol. L331/1): available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-
en.pdf?49c9d3be4e6566e3eb2c1f0b210d4980. [Hereinafter ESRB Regulation].  
 
102 Article 9, Tasks related to consumer protection and financial activities; Article 26, European system of 
national Investor Compensation Schemes, ESA founding Regulations. 
103 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
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where such systemic risks are deemed to be significant,104 and, issue recommendations for 
remedial action and, where appropriate, making those recommendations public.105 The ESRB 
can determine an emergency situation where it may issue a confidential warning addressed to the 
European Council. This should provide the Council with an assessment of the situation106 in 
order to enable the Council to adopt a decision addressed to the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) determining the existence of an emergency situation.107 It is for the Council – 
and not for the ESRB, which serves only the advisory function- to make decisions on such 
emergencies. The ESRB works in close cooperation with several other parties to the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS),108 including the EU Commission and EU Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC) for surveillance.109 Jointly with the European Council it 
performs a collective oversight for systemic stability policies and it co-operates with the IMF, 
BIS, and FSB to identify and assess SIFIs in the EU.110 Moreover, in collaboration with the 
ESAs, it maintains a common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators (risk dashboard) to 
identify and measure systemic risk.111  
Naturally, there are ambiguities surrounding the ESRB’s role. First, ESRB’s very low 
visibility almost tow years after it ‘opened for business’, shows that, in practice, it is not the 
paramount macro-prudential regulator in the EU.  Secondly, since it is a soft law body with 
informal status, it is very much dependent for information collection on national supervisory and 
regulatory authorities. The ESRB’s dependence on other bodies to carry out some of its tasks and 
above all its mandate also implies that it may easily become involved in national and European 
level political struggles and reputation damaging litigation. Secondly, because of the ESRB’s 
closeness with the ECB, which is it the effective lender of last resort in the Eurozone, its 
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105 Article 3 and Article 16, ESRB Regulation. 
106 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
107 Recital 22, ESRB Regulation 
108 Article 16, ESRB Regulation.  
109 See, Dierick, F., Lennartsdotter, P., & Favero, P. D. (2012). The ESRB at work—its role, organization 
and functioning. Macro-prudential Commentaries, ESRB(1), available at 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/commentaries/ESRB_commentary_1202.pdf 
110 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
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credibility and independence may further be compromised by the ECB’s policy priorities.112 It 
should be noted here that the ECB – unlike traditional central banks who are endowed with 
powers to employ both monetary policy and LoLR instruments in response to financial crisis – 
though it has a clear role with respect to monetary policy (Article 127(2) TFEU, and Article 18 
of the ESCB Statute), it has a very limited mandate vis-à-vis the discharge of LoLR powers. 
Also, until the ESM moves into full action, only fiscal authorities can effect bailouts using 
taxpayers’ money.113 The absence of fiscal union/ powers in the Eurozone therefore, poses an 
additional constraint to the ECB apart from the restrictions that the Treaty itself provides to 
deliver effectively as LoLR in Eurozone crisis. 
  
b. European Banking Authority (EBA)  
The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010114 and has officially started 
operations as of 1 January 2011. Having taken over the tasks and responsibilities of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), EBA acts as a hub and support network 
of EU and member state national bodies, safeguarding the stability of the financial system, the 
transparency of markets and financial products and the protection of depositors and investors.  
Regulation, oversight, and consumer Protection are the core functions of the EBA as laid 
down in the EBA Regulation. The fundamental objective of EBA is to develop a single European 
supervisory and recovery and resolution rulebook, in order to achieve a level playing field for 
financial institutions and raise the quality of financial regulation and the overall functioning of 
the Single Market. EBA’s oversight activities focus on identifying, analyzing and addressing key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Avgouleas, E. (2012). Another perspective is raised by Goodhart and Franklin Allen et.al., who argue 
that the ECB might not necessarily be a ‘tougher supervisor’ than national authorities. See Goodhart, C. 
and Allen, F.  in Beck, T. (2012). Banking Union for Europe Risks and Challenges, [electronic resource], 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Thorsten%20Beck_Banking_Union.pdf Pp 105-119 
113 See, Goodhart, C. (2003). The Political Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe. In J. Kremer, 
D. Schoenmaker & P. Wierts (Eds.), Financial Supervision in Europe: : Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
114 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC.  (Vol. 331/12): Official Journal of the 
European Union, available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-
en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b.  
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risks in the EU banking sector to strengthen European supervision of cross-border banking 
groups. EBA is also committed to enhance consumer protection and promote transparency, 
simplicity and fairness for consumers of financial products and services across the Single 
Market.115  
c.  Evaluation 
The ECB together with the Central Banks of the EU Member States (NCBs) comprises the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This configuration produces in itself structural 
complexity.116 which has its roots in the dual role performed by the NCBs. The NCBs are 
national agencies while performing non-ESCB functions and at the same time, NCBs constitute 
an important part of the ESCB and play a role in the conduct of EMU monetary policy. This 
functional complexity has deeper roots that relate to their constitutive laws. Whereas the ECB 
operates solely under the EC law, while the status of the NCBs is governed by both the EC law 
and national legislation. In addition, no provision was made, until the advent of the EBU, for the 
ECB to have any regulatory oversight over cross-border banks. The ESFS did not remedy the 
‘mismatch’ between the geographic scope of European bank activities and the regulatory remit 
of the authorities supervising them. On the contrary, the ESFS might be accused of just 
providing yet another layer of complexity in the EU structures. Therefore, even after the 
implementation of the de Larosiere reforms, cross-border supervision and bank resolution at the 
EU level remained decentralized and in want of further clarifications as to how ESAs would be 
able to control and manage their complicated tasks when parties involved would include non-EU 
countries.  
Finally, he structures developed under the ESFS for cross-border bank supervision 
remain complex and involve too many levels of over-lapping competences that may lead to 
critical delays during a crisis.117 And then, if any major European bank or a financial institution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See, EBA Work Program 2013. (28 September 2012) (Vol. EBA BS 2012 163 FINAL): The European 
Banking Authority, available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/aboutus/Work%20Programme/EBA-BS-2012-163-FINAL--EBA-
work-programme-for-2013-.pdf. 
116 Lastra, R. M., & Louis, J.-V. (2013). 
117 E.g., Jamie Dimon has raised a very pertinent question with respect to the effectiveness of regulatory 
reforms: “ has anyone bothered to study the cumulative effect of these regulatory and market fixes?” on 
June 07, 2011. Ben Bernanke, the Fed Chairman issues a statement, as reproduced by Barth, “the central 
bank doesn’t have the quantitative tools to study the net impact of all the regulatory and market changes 
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fails, it would certainly have repercussions outside EU,118 though no provision is made for 
formalized cooperation structures with third country regulators beyond those provided in the 
(informal) context of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board. The most important international 
co-operation issue is of course the need to draw up clear fiscal burden sharing arrangements.119  
Moreover, even under the EFSF extensive reliance is being placed on the judgment and 
decisions of the home supervisor.120 A binding mediation mechanism is required to deal with 
such cross-border supervisory problems. Without such an effective and binding mechanism, 
some Member States might in the future try to limit the branching activities of any firm regulated 
only by a home supervisor, who is judged to have failed to meet the required standards of 
supervisory practice. Such fragmentation would represent a major step backwards for the Single 
Market.121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
over the last three years…It’s too complicated” to study the new regulations’ effect. Reproduced in Barth, 
J. R., & Prabha, A. P. (December 03, 2012). Moreover, James Barth contends that not everyone is 
convinced of the new regulations in place (in case of the US, the Dodd-Frank Act) has solved the too-big-
to-fail problem, yet, the biggest banks have not been downsized despite the presence of a general 
consensus from various stake-holders. He quotes from Sheila Bair (Former FDIC Chair, Fortune, 
February 06, 2012), Richard Fischer & Harvey Rosenblum (FRB of Dallas, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 
2012), and, Simon Johnson (Professor at MIT, Bloomberg, October 10, 2011). See, Barth, J. R., & 
Prabha, A. P. (December 03, 2012). Breaking (Banks) Up is Hard to Do: New Perspectives on Too Big to 
fail. Financial Institutions Centre.  Retrieved from http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-16.pdf  
118 See, Beck, T. (25 October 2011). The Future of Banking, A VoxEU.org eBook   Retrieved from 
http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/the_future_of_banking.pdf 
119 Goodhart and Schoenmaker have proposed binding burden-sharing arrangement among national 
governments. If a cross-border bank faces difficulties, the governments would share the costs according to 
some predetermined key – for example, according to the distribution of the troubled bank’s assets over 
the respective countries. Under such a burden sharing approach, a common solution can be found upfront. 
By pre-committing to burden sharing, governments would give up some of their sovereignty, but in 
return, the single market in banking serving Europe’s businesses and consumers would be saved. 
Goodhart, C. A. E., & Schoenmaker, D. (2006). Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe. Sveriges 
Riksbank Economic Review, 2, 34-57. This proposal was refined and suggested to become an integral part 
of group level recovery and resolution plans for cross-border banks in Avgouleas, E, Goodhart, C. & 
Schoenmaker, D. (2013). Bank Resolution Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform. Journal of 
Financial Stability, 9, in press.  
120 See, Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU. European Union, Brussels, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf.  
121 EU. (June 22, 2012). Country-specific recommendations on economic and fiscal policies: The 
European Semester, 2012. Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131135.pdf.  
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2.  Phase II:  From the ESFS to the European Banking Union: Overview of EU Reforms in 
the post-2011 era 
The nature of the regulatory architecture itself may not be an important cause of a financial 
crisis. Yet the ‘institutional design’ can be very important for the prevention and resolution of a 
major financial crisis. Prevention is dealt with through a framework of systemic risk control and 
robust prudential regulations. Crisis management and resolution, on the other hand, require 
established supervisory and resolution structures, which in an integrated market, must have a 
cross-border remit, in order to override or subsume the principle of home country control.122 For 
a very long time and until the different pillars of the European Banking Union come into place, 
the regulatory structures of the EU have been characterized by three principles: decentralization, 
lack of coordination and segmentation. A carefull look at the developmental phase of European 
institution-building reveals this has been a process of experimentation rather than design.123 The 
preceding analysis of the crisis and of the responses to it has shown that the inadequacies of the 
EU financial and institutional framework have played an important role in undermining the 
stability of the Eurozone financial sector during the crisis. 
The EU Treaties did not establish clear institutional borders as a prerequisite for the 
efficient functioning of ‘multilevel European governance’. This flaw was most evident in the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. European responses to this crisis highlighted the current role of 
and power balance among EU institutions and Member States where the Union continues only to 
react to, and very rarely foresees, urgent needs and international developments which call for a 
speedy reaction. ‘Who does what’ in Europe has been occupying policy-makers for many 
years.124 A ‘competence catalogue’ was included in the Lisbon Treaty, in force since 1 December 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
122 Garicano, L., & Lastra, R. M. (2010). Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles. Journal of International Economic Law, 13(3), 597-621. See also, The new supervisory 
framework in the EU, see Arroyo, H. T. (2011). The EU’s Fiscal Crisis and Policy Response: reforming 
economic governance in the EU Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission, available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgetingandpublicexpenditures/48871475.pdf  
123 Schoenmaker, D. (19 December 2009). The financial crisis: Financial trilemma in Europe VOX: 
Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists. 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/financial-crisis-and-europe-s-financial-trilemma  
124 COM. (2001). European Governance - A White Paper.  Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities. 
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2009. This distinguishes between EU and the member state powers/competences on the basis of 
the principle of conferral and recognition. Essentially, for the first time in EU’s history it has 
been explicitly enshrined in the Treaties that competences not conferred upon the Union remain 
with the Member States.125  
The EU, as a whole, has embarked on to a number of initiatives to build an integrated 
surveillance framework with respect to: (a) the implementation of fiscal policies under the 
Stability and Growth Pact to strengthen economic governance and to ensure budgetary 
discipline, and, (b) the implementation of structural reforms. As a first step, Eurozone Heads of 
State adopted the intergovernmental Euro Plus Pact, to strengthen the economic pillar of EMU 
and achieve a new quality of economic policy coordination, with the objective of improving 
competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence. As this remains outside 
the existing institutional framework a constitutional amendment to the EMU will be required to 
implement it.126 In addition, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a ‘six-pack’ set of 
new legislative acts, aimed at strengthening the Eurozone’s economic governance by reduction 
of deficits through tighter control of national finances.127 The reforms represented the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). 
126 Conclusions of the European Council, 24–25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/10 REV 1, and subsequently 
revised conclusions, EU. (January 25, 2012). Conclusions of the European Council, December 09, 2011 
(Vol. EUCO 139/1/11 REV 1). 
 
127 The legislative ‘six-pack’ set of European economic governance architecture reforms comprised five 
regulations and one directive, proposed by the European Commission to come into force on 13 December 
2011. See, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 
16, 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011, L 306/1; 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011, L 
306/8; Regulation (EU) No 1175/ 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 2011 on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1177/2011 of November 08, 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Directive 
2011/85/EU of November 08, 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ 
2011 L 306/41. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm  
See also Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 04, 
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comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the 
launch of the EMU almost 20 years ago. This legislative package aims at concrete and decisive 
steps towards ensuring fiscal discipline to stabilize the EU economy and to avert new crisis in 
future.  
Moreover, the EMU is currently in the process of adopting a number of radical 
institutional reforms with a view of addressing the existential challenges it is facing. Radical 
measures have been adopted, which aim at stabilizing market conditions and containing the 
impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on the banking system and vice versa, containing negative 
feedback loops between banks and sovereigns.128  Breaking up the vicious circle of bank debt 
piling up on sovereign debt is a matter of utmost importance for the survival of the Eurozone. EU 
members need to complete the adjustment of internal and external imbalances, to repair financial 
sectors and to achieve sustainable public finances.129 The economic and financial crisis has 
exacerbated pressure on the public finances of EU Member States where 23 out of the 27 
Member States fall in the so-called ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP). EDP is a mechanism 
established by the EU Treaties obliging countries to keep their budget deficits below 3% of GDP 
and government debts below 60 percent of GDP. Accordingly, the Member States running any 
excess deficit must comply with the recommendations and deadlines as decided by the EU 
Council to correct their excessive deficit.130 Piling up debt in their effort to bail out Europe’s 
ailing banks only makes things worse. In addition, it raises the cost of borrowing for Eurozone 
members to unsustainable levels, necessitating continuous bailouts by the wealthier members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12, at 15–16. 
128 See also, Ferran, E. (2010). Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market 
Supervision. In G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt & E.Wymeersch (Eds.), Rethinking Financial Regulation and 
Supervision in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2012). 
129 EU. (Spring 2012). European Economic Forecast (Vol. European Economy:  1|2012). European 
Commission:  Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-1_en.pdf 
130 There is however, mounting criticism of the conditionality of deficit reduction by pursuing austerity 
measures and tighter control of national expenses, especially on the member states facing financial 
stresses. See for example, Bellofiore, R. (2013) who perceives a way out of crisis requires not only 
monetary reforms and expansionary coordinated fiscal measures, but also a wholesale change of 
economic model built upon a new ‘engine’ of demand and growth that requires a monetary finance of 
‘good’ deficits. Bellofiore, R. (2013). ‘Two or three things I know about her’: Europe in the global crisis 
and heterodox economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics.   
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the Eurozone in an effort to keep the EMU from breaking up. However, such sovereign bailouts 
are not only very expensive they are also highly unpopular with the citizens of lender countries. 
The most important of forthcoming reforms is the decision to move towards a banking 
union reflected by the legislative proposal for a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for the 
euro area, the entry into force of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the ECB 
decision to undertake Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for the 
bonds of Eurozone countries. Conditional on measures implemented at the national level, these 
policy initiatives will also support fiscal consolidation and private sector deleveraging.131 The 
Liikanen report132 has proposed solutions to separate deposit-taking banking from riskier 
banking activities. However, a comprehensive EU mandate on structural reform of the EU 
banking sector may take some time as the EU faces so many existential problems on numerous 
fronts. 
Finally, irrespective of the progress already achieved on the policy side, the experience of 
the past two years reflects that reversal of sentiment in financial markets and widening of interest 
rate spreads can happen very rapidly if the implementation of radical measures falters or the 
measures do not seem radical enough to meet the requisite challenges. The next few paragraphs 
will provide an analytical account of the reforms that are developed to strengthen the EU’s 
financial and monetary stability with particular focus on the forthcoming Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the mooted pan-European resolution and deposit insurance arrangements. 
 
3.  The European Banking Union 
Responding to the ever growing pressure for more bank and sovereign bailouts the European 
Commission initiated the establishment of institutions that would support the ESM133 and lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 EU. (Autumn 2012). European Economic Forecast (Vol. European Economy: 7|2012). European 
Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-1_en.pdf. 
132 Liikanen, E. (October 02, 2012). High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU 
banking sector. Brussels; available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/report_en.pdf.  
133 See, Article 81 of the Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010; Regulation No 1094/2010; and Regulation (EU) 
No 1095/2010 
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the establishment of a more integrated banking union in the EMU.134 This has, in principle, three 
pillars: a unified supervision mechanism (the SSM), operated by the European Central Bank, a 
future pan-European deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and a future single bank resolution 
mechanism with common backstops.  
It should be noted here that new structures adopted by the leadership of the Eurozone to 
put off the burning flames of the continuous banking and sovereign debt crisis are not without 
their detractors. Authoritative voices argue that European-level crisis management action 
(including bank recapitalizations by the ESM) which is so far contingent on the establishment of 
a permanent institutional infrastructure (i.e., an effective SSM) has been perceived as ‘a delaying 
tactic’ and in denial of the urgency of the present situation.135 Another sensitive question pertains 
to whether the doors of a new integrated financial supervisory mechanism are to be closed on 
non-EU countries. 
  
a.  The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
As mentioned earlier, the EU’s reliance on national supervisory structures for the single market 
proved to be flawed. The failure of the rudimentary crisis management coordination mechanisms 
that were in place, through the Lamfalussy level 3 committees, lacked both the competence and 
the resources to cope with a cross-border banking crisis that endangered taxpayers’ money. Lack 
of appropriate co-ordination structures was nowhere more evident than bank recovery and 
resolution. Similarly the complete absence of a centralized EU structure dealing with systemic 
risk monitoring was incomprehensible. The most important of those gaps in the Eurozone 
institutional edifice is about to be remedied through the establishment of the first and most 
significant pillar of the proposed European Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). 
On 12 September 2012 the Commission proposed a single supervisory mechanism for 
Eurozone banks, which will be run by the European Central Bank (ECB), in order to strengthen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See, speech of the President of the EU Commission Manuel Barroso, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/archives/2012/06/20120626_speeches_2_en.htm  
135 Véron, N. (October 17, 2012 ). The First Step in Europe’s Banking Union: Difficult but Achievable. 
RealTime Economic Issues Watch; the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Available at 
http://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime/?p=3174. 
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the Economic and Monetary Union. The SSM is the first step towards an integrated ‘banking 
union’ which includes further components such as a single rulebook, common deposit protection 
and single bank resolution mechanisms. The Commission called on the Council and the 
European Parliament to adopt proposed regulations by the end of 2012, together with the other 
three components of an integrated ‘banking union’ – the single rulebook in the form of capital 
requirements (IP/11/915), harmonized deposit protection schemes (IP/10/918), and a single 
European recovery and resolution framework (IP/12/570).  In the words of the president of the 
European Commission José-Manuel Barroso: 
 
This new system, with the European Central Bank at the core and involving national 
supervisors, will restore confidence in the supervision of all banks in the euro area…We 
should make it a top priority to get the European supervisor in place by the start of next 
year. This will also pave the way for any decisions to use European backstops to 
recapitalize banks.  
 
Barroso has also explained with authority the main purpose of these arrangements: ‘We want to 
break the vicious link between sovereigns and their banks. In future, bankers' losses should no 
longer become people's debt, bringing into doubt the financial stability of whole countries.’  
The desirable ambit of the ECB’s supervisory powers has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Several member states have wanted the SSM to be restricted to 
‘systemically important’ banks. For example, there is a controversy on whether German savings 
and cooperative banks should come under the remit of the SSM, as these banks consider 
themselves as local regional banks with passive assets and low risk exposures hence, subject to 
different policy regime from commercial banks. However, small or medium-size banks can also 
endanger the stability of EU financial system as well, e.g., the failures of banks like Northern 
Rock or the Spanish Caixas. Thus, a single supervisory mechanism is probably a more effective 
option. Furthermore, the existence of two supervisory mechanisms for banks, operating in the 
same market, would inevitably create conflicts of jurisdiction and competence (‘turf wars’) 
undermining the banking union. Early indications say that the ECB will be empowered to take 
over the supervision of any bank in the Eurozone if it so decides, in particular if the bank is 
receiving public support. Namely, the ECB will set the rules and be able to assume directly all 
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relevant supervisory tasks, whenever it considers it appropriate, for each one of these 6,000 
Eurozone banks. However, in principle, the ECB will focus its direct supervision only on those 
banks, which can generate significant prudential risks through their size or risk profile.  
Thus, within the unified supervisory system, the ECB have direct responsibility for 
around 150 banks with assets of more than 30 billion Euros, or those with assets representing 
more than 20 percent of a Member State’s GDP. National supervisors within the same unified 
supervisory system will primarily supervise the remaining banks. Finally, while the ECB will 
have the power to step in to assume direct supervision at any moment, if need be, national 
supervisors will remain in charge of tasks like consumer protection, money laundering and 
branches of third country banks. ECB supervision will be phased in automatically on 1 July 2013 
for the most significant European systemically important banks, and on 1 January 2014 for all 
other banks.  
The ECB will be vested with the necessary investigatory and supervisory powers to 
perform its task and will apply single rulebook across the single financial market to carry out 
following functions:   
i. Licensing/authorizing credit institutions;  
ii. Monitoring compliance with capital, leverage and liquidity requirements;  
iii. Conducting supervision of financial conglomerates; and, 
iv. Early intervention measures (Prompt Corrective Action) when a bank breaches or risks 
breaching regulatory capital requirements by requiring banks to take remedial action.  
The reforms roadmap bequeaths ECB the status of a mother institution for the SSM. The June 
2012 statement136 identifies article 127(6) of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty137 as the legal 
basis for the SSM, which means the new supervisor will be part of the ECB. Yet the roadmap 
does not hand over the management of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to the ECB 
until the new supervisory structures prove their effectiveness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Euro Area Summit Statement. (June 29, 2012). Brussels, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.  
137 Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. (30 March 2010). Official Journal of the European Union: C 83/01, Volume 53. 
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The legislative proposals138 published by the Commission establishing the SSM have still 
to work out appropriate solutions for some outstanding issues. Firstly, as regards the 
geographical reach of the membership, that is, who to include and who to exclude from the EU 
members into the EBU. Beck has argued that the need for a banking union is stronger within a 
currency union because as it is here where the close link between monetary and financial 
stability plays out strongest and where the link between government and banking fragility is 
exacerbated as national governments lack policy tools that countries with an independent 
monetary policy have available.139 But some non-euro area member states, including in Central 
Europe and Scandinavia, may want to join, and they have a veto over decisions under article 
127(6). However, as far as the UK is concerned, it has been made categorically obvious that it 
would not join the SSM. Thus, while, the Commission maintains that the banking union and the 
single market are mutually reinforcing processes and that the establishment of banking union is 
inseparable from the completion of substantive regulatory reforms, which are already underway 
for the single market under the ‘single rulebook’, the geopolitical reality might be that the EMU 
and non-EMU members (Member States with a derogation) within the EU are pulling much 
further apart than ever before.140  
Secondly, there is a legitimate concern that adding supervision - a politically charged task 
- to the ECB’s responsibilities, may compromise its impartiality and independence. Therefore, 
the supervisory function needs to be kept discrete and independent from the rest of the ECB 
structures to preserve its institutional autonomy. This is a very important distinction since 
banking and monetary policy, though inter-linked, are not identical.	   However, there are 
contrasting views as regards the extent and form of separation between the two functions.141 
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Challenges, [electronic resource], Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
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140 Member States who have not adopted the euro are not members of the Governing Council of the ECB.   
141 E.g., there is overlap of representatives between the supervisory board and the Governing Council. 
Therefore, as Beck and Gros conclude that raising Chinese walls between the two highly overlapping 
	   45	  
 
b.  The New EU Resolution Framework: Plans for Integrated Resolution Funds and Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes 
To provide for common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits, the 
Commission has proposed instituting a single resolution mechanism, which would govern the 
resolution of banks and coordinate in particular the application of ‘resolution tools’ to banks 
within the EU. The resolution mechanism is aimed at safeguarding the continuity of essential 
banking operations, to protect depositors, client assets and public funds, and to minimize risks to 
financial stability. This mechanism would be more efficient than a network of national resolution 
authorities particularly in the case of cross-border failures, given the need for speed and 
credibility in addressing the issues in the midst of a crisis.142 The decisions have to be taken in 
line with the principles of resolution as set out in the single rulebook consistent with 
international best practices and in full compliance with Union state aid rules, in particular that, 
shareholders and creditors should bear the cost of resolution before any external funding is 
granted.143 
The main resolution tools, as detailed in the Commission’s proposal directive for crisis 
management and resolution, are the following:  
(1) the sale of business tool whereby the authorities would sell all or part of the failing 
bank to another bank, without the consent of shareholders);  
(2) the bridge bank tool, which consists of identifying the good assets or essential 
functions of the bank and separates them into a new bank (bridge bank). The bridge bank 
will later be sold to another entity, in order to preserve these essential banking functions 
or facilitate the continuous access to deposits. The old bank with the bad or non-essential 
functions would then be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bodies would make no sense. See, Beck, T., & Gros, D. (March 2013). Monetary Policy and Banking 
Supervision: Coordination instead of Separation. European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2013-
003; published as CEPS Policy Brief. 
142 See also, Beck, T. (2012). Banking Union for Europe Risks and Challenges, [electronic resource], 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Thorsten%20Beck_Banking_Union.pdf and Schinasi, G. 
(November 05, 2012) also distinguishes between immediate crisis resolution and intermediate to long-
term measures. 
143 EC. (Sep 09, 2012). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union (Vol. COM (2012) 510 final). Brussels. 
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(3) the asset separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are put into an asset 
management vehicle. This tool relieves the balance sheet of a bank from bad or ‘toxic’ 
assets. In order to prevent this tool from being used solely as a state aid measure, the 
framework prescribes that it may be used only in conjunction with another tool (bridge 
bank, sale of business or write-down). This ensures that while the bank receives support, 
it also undergoes restructuring; and, 
(4) the bail-in tool, whereby the bank would be recapitalized with shareholders wiped out 
or diluted, and creditors would have their claims reduced or converted to shares.  
Therefore, an institution for which a private buyer cannot be found, or which cannot split up 
without destroying franchise value and other intra-firm synergies, could thus continue to provide 
essential services without the need for bail-out by public funds, and authorities would have time 
to reorganize it or wind down parts of its business in an orderly manner. To this end, banks 
would be required to have a minimum percentage of their total liabilities in the shape of 
instruments eligible for bail-in. If triggered, they would be written down in a pre-defined order in 
terms of seniority of claims in order for the institution to regain viability. The choice of tools will 
depend on the specific circumstances of each case and build on options laid out in the resolution 
plan prepared for the bank. 
A bank would become subject to resolution when: (a) it has reached a point of distress 
such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe, (b) all other 
intervention measures above have been exhausted, and (c) winding up the institution under 
normal insolvency proceedings would risk prolonged uncertainty or financial instability. Thus, 
entry into resolution will always occur at a point close to insolvency.  
The Commission has also proposed the harmonization and simplification of protected 
deposit regimes, faster pay-outs and improved financing of schemes, notably through ex-ante 
funding of deposit guarantee schemes and a mandatory mutual borrowing facility between the 
national schemes. Therefore, if a national deposit guarantee scheme finds itself depleted, it can 
borrow from another national fund. The mutual borrowing facility would be the first step 
towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme, and would be a natural complement to the 
establishment of a single supervisory mechanism. The single rulebook could include rules on the 
structure of the banking sector.  
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The EBA should develop a single supervisory handbook to complement the single 
rulebook. In order to avoid any divergence between the Euro Area and the rest of the EU, the 
single rulebook should be underpinned by uniform supervisory practices. Different supervisory 
handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States participating in the single 
supervisory mechanism and the other Member States pose a risk of fragmentation of the single 
market, as banks could exploit the differences to pursue regulatory arbitrage.  
 
D.  Evaluation of EU Regulatory Reforms  
Weaknesses in the institutional framework have affected EU financial integration in two ways: 
firstly, the incomplete or partial harmonization of the pre-crisis supervisory and regulatory 
framework prevented the benefits of full integration from being reaped and created fragilities in 
the financial sector to build up in a way that became threatening over time and, secondly, the 
crisis revealed the vulnerabilities and gaps in the national and EU-wide crisis management 
frameworks. These weaknesses have resulted in partial disintegration of the internal market and 
have caused splits along national lines of some segments of the single EU market for capital and 
financial services.144 Thus, for the EU, progression to a framework of tighter financial integration 
and risk controls for the banking system – together with improved governance standards in the 
monetary and fiscal spheres and centralization of responsibility for financial stability – has 
become a one-way road. 
Current EU reforms promise to create a stronger financial and institutional framework in 
order to strengthen the resilience of the single market and mitigate the risk of vicious circles of 
market instability and fragmentation observed during the GFC and the on-going Eurozone debt 
crisis.145 Nonetheless, current integration efforts are high risk, as their core only extends to the 
seventeen EMU members and, thus, it might create irreparable fractures for the internal market 
that remains incomplete at this stage.146 Moreover, the new arrangements under the SSM need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 ECB. (April 2012). Financial Integration in Europe: European Central Bank. P.87 
145 ECB. (April 2012). Financial Integration in Europe: European Central Bank. P.12 
146 Lastra, R. (2013).  Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 36, forthcoming. 
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become ‘first-best’147 framework in order to stabilize the euro-area sovereign debt crisis and 
financial instability. Effective supervision, however, will challenge the fiscal sovereignty of 
Eurozone members,148 especially, as the SSM will be able to activate the permanent EU rescue 
fund in order to directly recapitalize struggling Eurozone banks, such as those in Spain. This 
initiative, which essentially centralizes control over Eurozone finances by reducing the power of 
national governments, has attracted criticism from different quarters with respect to the role of 
the ECB, which will end up mustering an enormous amount of power without having a 
democratic mandate. At the same time, the legal basis for the new arrangements must be robust 
and must include a mechanism for judicial review, and gives rise to criticism as to whether this is 
best feasible under Article 127(6) of TFEU or other Treaty provisions.  
Finally, the establishment of the SSM is only a big first step on a much longer path 
towards building crisis management and resolution institutions for the EU banking union. There 
remain several essential components such as a European banking charter, a fully-fledged single 
rulebook, a single resolution authority and a common deposit insurance scheme whose detailed 
arrangements are still to be worked out. 
 
IV. Asian Financial Regionalism 
A.  Introduction 
The reform of the EU integration mechanisms in the aftermath of the GFC and in the context of 
Eurozone debt crisis marks an important milestone in the integration process and regionalism 
drive, especially because it has exposed the failure of various institutional mechanisms supposed 
to ensure financial market stability. The EU crisis response bears significant implications in the 
development and functioning of single market operations and has emphasized the need to 
improve international and regional coordination on fiscal, monetary and financial policies 
affecting other states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Schinasi elaborates on ‘first-best’ mechanism in the EU context comprising of single supervisor, 
uniform deposit insurance, and European resolution mechanism. 
148 Schinasi, G. (November 05, 2012). European Banking Union: Pros and Cons - A View from Across 
the Atlantic. Power point presentation, Available at 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Garry%20Schinasi_European%20Banking%20Union%20.pdf.  
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Over a period of several decades, the progressive development of an integrated single 
financial market in the EU combined with a single currency among 17 of its members led to the 
imbalances that became visible when the GFC erupted in 2008.149 Unfortunately, despite the vast 
amount of effort expended in developing both the EU single financial market and EMU, 
important design features necessary to support financial stability had not been put in place or 
were not sufficiently robust, particularly in relation to burden sharing, resolution of cross-border 
financial institutions, deposit guarantee arrangements, regulation and supervision, and fiscal 
arrangements and affairs.  
Risks flowing from cross-border financial crises tend to intensify within integrated 
markets. The more integrated is a regional market the higher the propensity for cross-border 
contagion. The cascading effects of the on-going Eurozone crisis are a vivid reminder of the 
contagion risk in a highly integrated system.150 The EU crisis is a powerful reassertion of the 
same reality that reflects on the vulnerability of economically integrated markets in times of 
crisis when national responses prove insufficient to deal with the common issues in an 
economically integrated area. The ‘new-normality’ that has surfaced in the context of the 
prolonged crisis in the EU, and the anaemic US recovery, appears to depend on even bigger 
contributions to economic stability and growth from Asia. 
Building on the preceding review of Eurozone crisis and attendant reforms, this section 
explores regionalism in Asia in the context of issues relating to financial cooperation and 
integration. In this respect, Asian regionalism has been shaped by various market developments, 
external influences and various initiatives taken to respond to such common issues and to support 
stability of regional financial markets. From this basis, the paper analyses the implications for 
Asian regional financial arrangements from the financial integration-related issues that have 
arisen in the Eurozone crisis, including challenges to regionalism while highlighting potential 
opportunities to progress on regionalism in Asian context. This paper highlights the need for 
indigenous institutional infrastructure required to support integrated supra-national banking 
markets on the one hand, and the more transnational issues of financial liberalisation and free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Stark, J. (2012). Crisis and Recovery in Emerging Europe: The Policy Response in Retrospect and 
Challenges Ahead. In T. Bracke & R. Martin (Eds.), From Crisis to Recovery: Old and New Challenges 
in Emerging Europe [electronic resource]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
150 ADB. (July 2012). Asian Economic Integration Monitor: Asian Development Bank. 
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movement of capital, financial services and trade on the other hand, in the context of 
ASEAN/ASEAN+3/+6 and ASEAN Community Strategy (Vision 2020).151 
 
B.  Asian Financial Regionalism: A Brief Overview 
From the 1950s to the 1980s, individual economies in Asia adopted a range of models to support 
primarily domestic financial development. These ranged from Soviet style models of state 
ownership and control to liberal laissez-faire, with approaches to finance varying from model to 
model. By the end of the 1980s, the basic model in use was the Japanese model of ‘the 
developmental state with strong administrative direction of finance’ and this particular model 
proved the most successful in supporting balanced and inclusive economic growth and 
development in most of the East Asian economies. Gradually, this model tilted towards 
employing an export-led strategy to support economic growth while still maintaining a close 
relationship between government, business, and finance. Finance in this model largely originated 
through bank loans rather than equity markets.152 Contrasting with today, during this period, 
economic regionalism, generally, and financial regionalism more specifically, remained very 
limited and fragile. However, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the 
tremendous increase in cross-border capital flows and currency instability over the 1980s and 
1990s led to the beginning of the formation of transactional regulatory international networks.  
During the 1990s, in the context of the then-dominant Washington Consensus, East Asian 
economies focused on integration with the global economy (primarily the developed Western 
financial systems and markets) by following rapid liberal economic and financial policies in 
certain specific areas. Selective market liberalization without a backstop of appropriate legal and 
regulatory institutions set the stage for 1997-98 crisis that highlighted flaws in the combination 
of Japanese-inspired state-led model of development and selective liberalization. However, the 
reforms pursued after the Asian crisis marked the first beginning of significant economic and 
financial regionalism in East Asia, as economies started looking at ‘common interests’, which 
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regional centrality and ASEAN Economic Community is an important milestone to the bigger objective 
of seamless, borderless economic community by 2030. See, ADBI. (2012). ASEAN 2030: Toward a 
Borderless Economic Community (Draft Highlights). Japan: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Institute, 
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152 For discussion, see Liu, Q., Lejot, P., & Arner, D. A. (2013). Finance in Asia: Institutions, Regulation 
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were not appropriately addressed under the prevalent international financial architecture.153 The 
developments in the western world and the global financial and economic crisis which 
commenced in 2007 marked another turning point from the ‘export-led’ growth model as the 
decrease in demand for Asian exports, shifted regional consensus to support economic 
rebalancing both regionally and internationally.  
In the East Asian context, a range of regional financial arrangements have been 
established, including, in particular, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), the 
Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) and aspects of ASEAN and 
ASEAN+3/+6. Since the prolonged global financial crisis have transformed into Eurozone debt 
crisis and a bland US recovery, growth rates and growth projections have slackened off for Asia 
as well, signaling for reforms required not only in western regulatory systems but also for 
regional markets in Asia.  
 
C.  Macroeconomic and Financial Cooperation in Asia 
This section provides an overview of macroeconomic and financial cooperation in Asia and the 
regional institutional financial arrangements aimed at the development of common financial 
norms and standards. Despite the fact that in response to the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and 2008-09 
GFC, East Asia has been progressing in respect of regional integration, yet these initiatives and 
institutional arrangements are at nascent stage of sophistication as compared to EU levels of 
development, because regional financial cooperation is constrained by national strategic rivalry 
and regulatory competition. The Asian reforms and regionalism initiatives focus only on 
increased rather than comprehensive and profound market integration; therefore, the possibility 
of regional monetary union in the near future is very unlikely, given the EU experiences on the 
one hand, and political differences in across East Asia, on the other.154  
However, despite the limitations, there are regional mechanisms at work. The 
ASEAN/+3/+6 Finance Ministers process plays a policy-setting role, including through the 
CMIM process (ASEAN+3 + Hong Kong).155 Regional financial and monetary policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See, Arner, D. W., & Schou-Zibell, L. (2010 October). Responding to the Global Financial and 
Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia. Asian Development Bank working paper.  
154 See, for a detailed account of financial cooperation in Asia, Liu, Q., Lejot, P., & Arner, D. A. (2013) 
155 For an analysis of ASEAN Charter, see, Shimizu, K. (2011). The ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN 
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cooperation also takes place through Executives' Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP) and the Bank for International Settlements’ Asian Consultative Council (BIS ACC), 
with support from the BIS. Standards have largely been derived from the international process, 
but with increasing trend to develop regionally tailored equivalents through regional groups of 
international organizations, such as IOSCO. At the same time, there has been some movement to 
develop an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) to coordinate regional cooperation, 
coordination, and surveillance mandate. Implementation of international standards is widespread 
in the region, but willingness to participate in international monitoring through the IMF has 
traditionally been limited, albeit it is now increasing rapidly as a result of G20 commitments to 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) participation. These arrangements may be 
sufficient for coordinative purposes; however, surveillance arguably requires a higher level of 
attention, with the CMIM having the potential to provide an appropriate framework, if 
effectively designed and implemented.  
 
1.  Developing regional financial markets 
The currency and maturity mismatches and a heavy reliance on bank loans in East Asia, under 
the developmental state approach to finance, underpinned the crisis in 1997-98. The crisis 
provided not only the biggest impetus to later regional developments but also highlighted the 
depth of infrastructure-related gaps extant in the Asian financial markets.156 Post-crisis attention 
paid to improve regional capital market development initially focused on the debt and money 
markets, but later, it began to consider wider securities market reform as well.157 The reform on 
debt market development has mainly focused on the ASEAN+3 ABMI.158 
ASEAN+3 launched Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) in 2003, to help promote 
domestic reforms aimed at expanding the size of national and regional bond markets, to attract 
regional and foreign investors, and strengthen the bond market infrastructure related needs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 See for a discussion on the logic of Asian integration efforts after 1997/98 crisis and challenges to 
further integration, Kawai, M. (2004). Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation in East Asia. 
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Policy Research Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the OECD, June 10-11; 
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explore regional cooperation to encourage capital market activity. The group’s visibility fell after the end 
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Another motive behind ABMI was also to help divert savings to local and regional investments. 
In this regard, the Asian Bond Fund (ABF), supported by EMEAP, promoted the development of 
national and regional bond markets by directly creating bond funds. The first such Fund, ABF1 
was launched in 2003. The ABF completed Phase 2 of the eight ABF2 single market funds in 
May 2011.159 Another initiative, the Roadmap+, was adopted in order to produce tangible and 
concrete outcomes going forward with the support from the ADB, and to reinvigorate the ABMI 
discussions.160 The Roadmap+ identified nine priorities which include: (i) launching guarantee 
programs under the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF); (ii) developing 
infrastructure-financing schemes (including a pilot project involving the Lao PDR and Thailand); 
(iii) fostering an investment-friendly environment for institutional investors and sharing ABMI 
expertise with them; (iv) enhancing ASEAN+3 Bond Market Forum (ABMF) activities 
(including the Common Bond Issuance Program); (v) facilitating the establishment of the 
Regional Settlement Intermediary (RSI); (vi) further developing government bond markets; (vii) 
enhancing financial access to consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); (viii) 
strengthening the foundation for a regional credit rating system; and (ix) raising financial 
awareness.161 While these initiatives and structures are aimed at intensifying efforts to build 
integrated financial markets under the ASEAN umbrella, yet the expectations from the lead 
regional economies - the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea - demand active cross-market 
role to propagate effective and resilient regional integration mechanisms.  
 
2.  Trade in financial services 
Asia is leading growth in global trade through intraregional and recently amplified ‘South-South’ 
trade in contrast to its traditional export markets used to primarily concentrate in the US and 
Europe. Despite the rise in trade related integration, financial integration lags behind trade and 
investment in East Asia. Given various ASEAN/+3/+6 agreements aimed at trade enhancement 
are implemented, it is likely that aspects relating to financial services trade will receive 
increasing attention. Cross-border trade flows, direct investment, and cross-border investment in 
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160 ADB. (July 2012) 
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capital goods have long been greater and faster growing than other regional capital flows. Formal 
economic integration is a relatively new initiative in East Asia. Amongst the most recent is the 
launch of the ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to create a free 
trade area with comprehensive economic cooperation. 
Prior to RCEP’s introduction, region-wide agreements were known as ASEAN-China 
Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), involving ASEAN+3 partners, and Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership for East ASIA (CEPEA), which is a Japanese led proposal for trade co-operation, 
and includes ASEAN+3 and India, Australia, and New Zealand. According to some estimates, 
the benefits from RCEP will much exceed the benefits from the formation of the ASEAN AEC. 
Also, such an arrangement has a potential to reduce the complexity of the current situation, 
which is known as ‘the noodle bowl syndrome’ - partly the result of a lack of vision toward East 
Asian economic integration. Currently there are five FTAs/EPAs between ASEAN and its 
partners. Some of them are also complemented by bilateral agreements between individual 
ASEAN members and their partners.162 
 
3.  Economic Review and Policy Dialogue 
The ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue is the most important mechanism for 
information exchange on economic conditions and policies in Asia. The ASEAN Surveillance 
Process was established in 1998, to monitor macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities and 
strengthen policy dialogue through peer review.163 In May 2000, ASEAN+3 finance ministers 
launched the Economic Review & Policy Dialogue (ERPD) Process. The ERPD also played a 
vital role in formulation of the regional liquidity support facility i.e., the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI). The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), was also an important step in 
institutionalizing the ERPD and a multilateralized version of the CMI, or CMIM. The important 
prescription that follows from current European crisis is that the regional surveillance must 
complement global surveillance, which is being conducted mainly by the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) and other multilateral organizations to provide comprehensive contagion-risk 
coverage.164  
 
4.  Regional financial safety nets 
The CMIM is the premier regional financial safety net for providing liquidity support to 
ASEAN+3 countries. The CMI was created with the purpose to “provide sufficient and timely 
financial support to ensure financial stability” in Asian region,165 and to supplement existing 
international facilities, primarily performed by the IMF internationally. CMI has been growing 
and expanding on its inception goals, and was multilateralized to become a collectively managed 
reserve-pooling arrangement (CMIM) governed by a single contract in 2010166 with US$120 
billion in commitments.167 At inception, 20 percent of the aggregate amount was to be available 
for drawing under CMIM by a user state, “de-linked” from specific IMF conditionality, but 
subject to rules to be developed by ASEAN+3 members.168 However, the arrangement was 
conceived as to “supplement the existing international financial arrangement.”169 This 
enhancement of the role was visualized in May 2012, when ASEAN+3 included and improved 
upon crisis resolution mechanism and a crisis prevention facility - CMIM Precautionary Line 
(CMIM-PL) - to further support the CMIM given the high degree of contagion-risks.170 An AMF 
was also mooted during the 1997-98 financial crisis when several Asian states required sudden 
infusions of credit but the plan was abandoned upon intense US opposition.171 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164ADB. (2009). Regional Surveillance for Economic Stability. Asia Economic Monitor. Available at 
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/aem/dec09/Dec_AEM_special.pdf; 
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/aem/dec09/Dec_AEM_complete.pdf.  
165 See, ASEAN+3. (May 2000). ASEAN+3. Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers Meeting: May 06: available at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/asean_plus_3/if014.htm. 
166 ASEAN. 2012. Joint Media Statement of the 15th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors’ Meeting. 3 May. 
167 See, ASEAN+3. (February 2009). Report from the Finance Ministers of the ASEAN+3 to Heads of 
States/Governments, and, ASEAN+3. (May 04, 2008). Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11th ASEAN+3 
Ministers Meeting. 
168 ASEAN+3 (May 2000). 
169 Ibid. 
170 I. Azis. 2012. Asian Regional Financial Safety Nets? Don’t Hold Your Breath. Public Policy Review. 8 
(1). 
171 A regional monetary fund was discussed again within ASEAN+3 in April 2006 in terms of benefits 
associated with a long-term currency alliance and monetary union. 
	   56	  
5.  Renminbi internationalization and regionalization  
Apart from encouraging cross-border investments in each other’s government bond market, the 
PRC, Japan and the Republic of Korea in December 2011, agreed to promote the use of local 
currencies in cross border transactions. The PRC has been promoting the international use of the 
renminbi as a regional invoicing currency.172 The renminbi’s potential as eventual reserve 
currency could help the PRC shield its domestic economy from US dollar volatility. While this 
move from the PRC bears deep and extensive implications for both regional and global economic 
cooperation and integration, it demands several pre-conditions to meet before Renminbi can 
enjoy the status of a reserve currency in parallel to the US dollar, and financial liberalization 
would be only one such requisite. Therefore, the goal to have Renminbi as a regional anchor 
currency to be followed by an international reserve currency requires open markets and 
institutional support infrastructures, accompanied by harmonization of standards, improved legal 
norms, better creditor rights amongst other prerequisites as seen from EU experience.173 
 
D.  The Asian Regional Financial Architecture: Implications for Existing Institutional 
Arrangements (CMIM, ASEAN/+3, EMEAP, AEC) 
This section discusses existing and on-going East Asian regional institutional arrangements, 
focusing on CMIM, ASEAN/ASEAN+3, EMEAP and AEC, and the possible implications of the 
Eurozone experience on existing structures. Although, the nature of the financial markets call for 
presence of much needed global regulator but because of the difficulties involved in crystalizing 
a global mechanism under the existing circumstances, regional institutions still can form a global 
framework instead to mandate minimum consistency across jurisdictions in regulatory principles 
applicable to similar markets, institutions, services, and products. 
East Asia, in seeking to further develop regional financial and economic markets, must 
take into account the debates on sovereignty trade-offs and economic stability, and jurisdictional 
risk trade-offs to ensure continuity and development of an integrated market. It has had its share 
of experience of ‘contagion-driven’ risks in 1997-98 when the level of Asian cross-border 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 In August 2010, HKMA allowed all authorized institutions to take part in the interbank bond market 
using Renminbi through a settlement agent and after seeking PBOC’s approval. Hong Kong, China, 
Singapore, and London all have some international trade settled in Renminbi - with Hong Kong, China 
taking the lead. In early July 2012, the Singapore Exchange announced that it is ready to list, quote, trade, 
clear and settle securities denominated in Renminbi. 
173 ADB. (July 2012). 
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financial holdings and market integration was far less than what it is now. Therefore, integration 
- that brings many advantages - nonetheless has its own down-side effects as well. 
One important lesson that transcends from past is that these frameworks must be sensitive 
to domestic peculiarities of especially less developed and smaller regional economies. Given the 
new international regulatory requirements on capital, liquidity and leverage ratios, meeting those 
higher standards could be challenging, for smaller states therefore, the development of regional 
arrangements such as the establishment of a high-level Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
(AFSD) would provide special support to such smaller economies in the region. One such 
mistake was done during the EU single market developmental phase by meandering around the 
eligibility criteria for member states through manipulation of economic data by the states in order 
to win eligibility to join the club. Therefore, any reform in Asia including the one being 
contemplated by ASEAN Economic Community to establish a ‘banking Union’ where states 
need to meet specific criterion before joining the ‘club’ must be structured with the lessons learnt 
from European experience in mind. Requisite institutional reforms must simultaneously be 
pursued at the national, regional and international level and focus on the following 
developmental requirements: (i) the need to balance regulation and innovation, (ii) establishment 
of national and cross-border crisis management and resolution mechanisms, (iii) preparation of a 
comprehensive framework and contingency plans for financial institution failure, including 
consumer protection measures such as deposit insurance, (iv) supporting growth and 
development with particular attention to the region’s financial needs for infrastructure and for 
SMEs, and (v) reforming the international and regional financial architecture.174 
 
1.  The Chiang Mai Initiative's Multilateralisation (CMIM) 
The CMIM provides the outline of a potential crisis management structure and of a potentially 
important liquidity mechanism for the region. However, even under the CMIM, crisis resolution 
at the sovereign level - as in the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis - remained with the IMF because 
the major donor countries in Asia (the PRC, Korea and Japan) were reluctant to assume full 
responsibility of a bail out. Therefore, the CMIM and current ASEAN+3 are marked by 
conflicting priorities. To respond to the 199-/98 crisis, there were neither regional arrangements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Arner, D. W., & Park, C. Y. (2010). Global Financial Regulatory Reforms: Implications for 
Developing Asia. Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, 57, 48-48. 
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available to deal with the resolution of individual financial intermediaries (including in most 
cases at the domestic level),175 nor for addressing the contagion impact of systemic loss of 
confidence that affected the region. However, the proposals to transform CMIM into a regional 
fund picked up pace as most of the Asian economies were dissatisfied with the liquidity support 
role played by the IMF in the 1997-98 crisis. Now, if CMIM were to evolve into an AMF, it 
would seem logical to combine liquidity provision and macroeconomic standard-setting and 
monitoring with more formalized arrangements for regional financial regulatory standards. 
Institutional developments of this kind also provide an opportunity to consider proper 
organization of the functions outlined here, whether or not formalized into a new AMF, 
including purposes, extent of non-Asian involvement, if any, conditions for usage, and whether 
any single state will lead the initiative. 
 
2.  ASEAN/ASEAN+3/+6 
ASEAN is presently the main regional arrangement addressing financial services liberalisation. 
At present, ASEAN is at a much more elementary stage of development than the EU. The 
hindrances to full financial service liberalization primarily revolve around the trade-offs attached 
to relinquishment of national policy controls, which is in accord Asian ethos and political 
traditions.176 Weaker regional institutions and the slower pace of integration are only a natural 
manifestation of these shared norms extant across region, which are in line with the consensual 
‘ASEAN way’. The organization of Asian capitalism on the basis of the developmental state 
model has been effective in Japan, Korea, and the PRC. It is characterized by close directional 
relationships between state and leading commercial interests.177 However, the Eurozone financial 
crisis highlights the necessity of having in place very clear ex ante arrangements for dealing with 
cross-border financial institution failures which calls for a greater role of ASEAN.178  
Over the years, ASEAN and its East Asian partners, the PRC, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea—ASEAN+3—have cooperated on three broad areas of macroeconomic and financial 
policies: (i) economic review and policy dialogue, (ii) regional financial safety nets, and (iii) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 see Arner and Norton (2009). 
176 This has clearly been manifested in the primacy of accumulation of international reserves in the region 
during the first decade of 21st century when national exchange rate policies ran supreme over any regional 
market development initiatives. 
177 See, Redding, G. (1990). The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism: Walter de Gruyter. 
178 Arner, D. W., & Schou-Zibell, L. (2010 October).  
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regional financial markets. These initiatives have been further strengthened in the aftermath of 
the GFC.179 The integration scale, however, has been far higher for trade in goods than in 
financial services. ASEAN’s 1995 Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)180 sought to 
reduce barriers to trade in services. Back in 2006, ASEAN and Australia’s official Regional 
Economic Policy Support Facility commissioned an assessment study that concluded that its 
performance was both disappointing and unimpressive.181 Presently, in the ASEAN+3 treaties, 
this area carries greater potential to support further regional financial integration. ASEAN+3 
along with WTO and ASEAN+6182 have also replaced APEC’s role in governance and resources 
(which was thought to be an effective forum for economic concerns prior to the 1997/98 
crisis).183 In the context of ASEAN / ASEAN+3, rather than a single supervisor, this is much 
more likely to focus on separately regulated and capitalised subsidiaries in each jurisdiction of 
operations (albeit to increasingly common standards based on international guidelines).  
APEC retains advantages over competing regional structures but it needs to seek reforms 
to accelerate the Bogor Goals184 and enhance APEC’s institution-building and monitoring system 
while ensuring its complementarity with other regional organizations including the WTO. 
APEC’s goal of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) can overcome structural 
limitations and serve as an effective ‘Plan B’ for the Doha Round standoff. Nonetheless, caution 
should be taken for legal challenges on the road to an FTAAP such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. Such reforms will strengthen APEC’s role under the multilateral trading system and 
reenergize the public–private partnership for trans-Pacific integration.185 Trade in goods is being 
addressed to date through ASEAN/+3/+6 treaty-based arrangements; however, based on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 ADB. (July 2012). P.48 
180 ASEAN. (Dec 15, 1995). Framework Agreement on Services: available at 
 http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1995%20ASEAN%20Framework%20Agreement%20on%20Services-
pdf.pdf.  See also, ASEAN. (Sep 02, 2003). Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Financial Services 
Agreement 
181 Thanh, V. T., & Bartlett, P. (2006). Ten Years of ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 
(AFAS): An Assessment., REPSF Project No. 05/004; available at 
http://www.aadcp2.org/uploads/user/6/PDF/REPSF/REPSF_05_004_FinalReport.pdf. 
182 Includes India, Australia, and New Zealand 
183 Hsieh, P. L. (2013). Reassessing APEC’s role as a Trans-Regional Economic Architecture: Legal and 
Policy Dimensions. Journal of International Economic Law, 16(1), 119-158. 
184  APEC. (November 15, 1994). Leaders' Declaration - Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common 
Resolve: Bogor, Indonesia, available at http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/1994/~/media/Files/LeadersDeclarations/1994/1994_LeadersDeclaration.ashx.  
185 Hsieh, P. L. (2013) 
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WTO experience, as these develop, it is likely that a more effective dispute resolution framework 
may become necessary at some point. As shown by the EU crisis, the relationship between 
liberalization and stability is much more critical in the case of the financial services industry, 
while liberalization may proceed, especially as regional and global financial institutions seek 
greater market access, it would appear best for economies for the foreseeable future to adopt 
arrangements for cross-border provision on the basis of separately capitalized and regulated 
subsidiaries, rather than following the passport system which has been adopted by the EU.  
 
3.  Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) 
EMEAP was established in 1991 to provide the main mechanism for central bank, regulatory and 
financial infrastructure cooperation in the region among the more developed financial 
jurisdictions. Other similar organizations in Asia include: South East Asia, New Zealand, 
Australia (SEANZA), the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training 
Centre, and the BIS (which is also playing a supporting role for EMEAP and regional central 
bank cooperation since 1990’s). EMEAP now co-organizes meetings with the European Central 
Bank (EMEAP–Euro system High Level Seminars) to increase communication and deepen 
relations between EMEAP and the Euro system since 2004. EMEAP plays a significant role in 
central bank coordination and cooperation amongst its membership, and works closely with 
ASEAN/+3/+6, ADB, BIS (especially the BIS ACC and Asian Office), and international 
standard setters. As a result of shared crisis experiences, the effectiveness and impact of the 
group has grown, with regional initiatives such as the ABF and support for CMIM.186 
 
4.  ASEAN Community and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
The ASEAN Vision 2020, first adopted by the ASEAN Heads of State/Govenrment in the Kuala 
Lumpur summit in in December 1997, was made more concrete in January 2007 when ASEAN 
Heads of State/Govenrment signed the Cebu Declaration187 on the Acceleration of the 
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Establishment of an ASEAN Community188 by 2015. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
shall be the goal of regional economic integration by 2015. AEC envisages the following key 
characteristics: (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic 
region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the 
global economy. Under the AEC roadmap, the monetary and financial integration is broadly 
structured around three themes: (i) harmonizing regulations, market standards, and rules; (ii) 
developing market infrastructure and regionally focused products and intermediaries; and (iii) 
strengthening member countries’ capacities.189 At their 16th meeting in Cambodia in April 2012, 
ASEAN finance ministers reaffirmed their commitment.190 However, there is a gap between 
declarations and the actual implementation of those pronouncements. The implementation rate of 
AEC Blueprint191 has recently increased to 74.5 percent.192 In the declaration, the domestic 
difficulties in implementation of AEC were also recognized, but ASEAN finance ministers 
agreed to intensify efforts in those areas under the AEC in order to achieve AEC goals by 
2015.193   
 The ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF) sets timelines for Pan-ASEAN 
banking strategy to be adopted in two stages. The first stage will focus on pan-ASEAN banking 
through separately capitalised subsidiaries. This will initially be done through the developed 
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189 ASEAN. (2009). Roadmap for an ASEAN Community; ASEAN. (2009). Implementing the Roadmap 
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190 ASEAN. (November 20, 2012). Declaration on the East Asia Summit Development Initiative. Phnom 
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http://asean2012.mfa.gov.kh/?page=detail&menu1=0&menu2=342&article=342&lg=en  
191 ASEAN Economic Blueprint was signed at the 13th ASEAN Summit, on 20 November 2007 in 
Singapore, to guide the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community 2015. See also, ADBI. 
(2012), and ASEAN. (2009). ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint Roadmap for an ASEAN 
Community 2009-2015 (pp. 21-67).  
192 Pushpanathan, S. (April 07, 2010, Wednesday). No place for passive regionalism in ASEAN, The 
Jakarta Post. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/07/no-place-passive-
regionalism-asean.html  
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http://asean2012.mfa.gov.kh/?page=detail&menu1=0&menu2=343&article=343&lg=en 
	   62	  
members, with the developing members following at a later stage.194 Such platforms necessitate 
regulatory convergence across jurisdictions. However, the Framework may be applicable to both 
ASEAN banks and non-ASEAN banks meeting the requirements. The idea is to have ‘Qualified 
ASEAN Banks’ (QABs), with regulatory harmonisation across ASEAN (once again, with the 
five developed countries going first, followed later by the developing members). Asian 
authorities have agreed upon four preconditions to ensure the banking integration framework is 
successfully implemented. The first is harmonization of regulations; second, building financial 
stability infrastructure; third, assisting the BCLMV countries to build their banking capacity, and 
fourth establishment of set criteria for ASEAN qualified banks to operate in any ASEAN country 
with a single ‘passport’. ABIF’s concept of integration is restricted to the commercial presence 
of qualified banks. Thus, it takes such presence as the benchmark for ASEAN banking 
integration by 2020. This is highly debatable because it will not necessarily reflect the success of 
ABIF in bringing about economic benefits and financial stability to the region.195 The second 
stage will allow branching, based on harmonisation and QABs which will require addressing 
issues such as supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. This resembles closely to the 
patterns that are being adopted at the EU level where banks would not be under the control and 
supervision of member state’s domestic laws rather the authority would be transferred to the 
ECB. 
 
E.  Challenges to Regionalism: The Way Forward 
In the context of furthering financial integration, the EU provides the leading example and 
simultaneously highlights very real difficulties for other regions, including Asia. As enhanced 
financial integration brings increased risk of contagion in the event of a crisis, regional 
cooperation is even more important for developing post-crisis resolution mechanisms. As the 
uncertainty of world financial conditions and heightened possibility of a contagion-driven crisis 
persistently looms over global financial markets, it only makes sense for Asian countries to have 
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their own regional safety nets strengthened in order to prevent a cross-border financial stability 
crisis triggered by exogenous factors. 
Seven building blocs ought to be present in any system of financial regulation in order to 
address systemic risk:  
(i) robust financial infrastructure, especially payment and settlement systems;  
(ii) well-managed financial institutions with effective corporate governance and risk 
management systems;  
(iii) disclosure requirements sufficient to support market discipline;  
(iv) regulatory systems designed to reinforce risk management and market discipline, 
as well as setting and monitoring potential risks across all financial institutions; 
(v) a lender of last resort institution/facility to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions on an appropriate basis, in the event of liquidity shocks;  
(vi) a resolution scheme for problem institutions; and  
(vii) appropriate rules and procedures to protect financial services consumers, such as 
deposit insurance.  
The global financial crisis has highlighted significant weaknesses in each of these parts of 
financial regulation design, which are currently being addressed by the G20.  
In Asia, the global financial crisis highlights the necessity of addressing a range of issues 
relating to financial integration and regionalism, which, in a sense, go much beyond the financial 
stability challenges raised by the global financial crisis. First, there is a pressing to continue with 
the development of Asian regional alternatives to address issues relating to liquidity, 
liberalization, regulation, capital controls and exchange rate volatility. Before the advent of the 
GFC, financial innovation was regarded as inextricably linked with economic growth and 
aggregate welfare however, in the wake of the crisis the utility of financial innovation has 
become more unequivocal. In addition, regional macroeconomic and financial surveillance 
mechanisms also have clear value, as demonstrated both by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis 
and the more recent global financial crisis, especially in the context of the euro area. The main 
challenge in terms of capital provision, however, is underdeveloped domestic and regional 
capital markets. As economies across the region grow and banks increase lending, there will be 
consequent requirements to increase capital. As a result, the availability of well-developed equity 
and debt capital markets to support bank capital will become an increasingly major concern. 
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Secondly, in addition to domestic and regional considerations, the crisis implies an 
enhanced role for the Asian economies within global regulatory and supervisory institutions, 
such as the IMF and Financial Stability Board (FSB). The IMF, G-20, and the FSB are pursuing 
structural reforms to allow wider representation of the Asian economies and tend to pay 
increased attention to Asian leaders’ recommendation with respect to redesigning the global 
regulatory architecture.  
Increasing Asian influence is grounded in (a) the relative success of more conservative 
Asian approaches to liberalization, and policy implementation, and (b) from the parallel decline 
of the contribution from the west in economic growth indicators vis-à-vis Asian countries. While 
there is a visible shift of focus from the western models towards Asian markets, this remains a 
fact that Asian financial markets are still evolving and, therefore, provide ample scope for newer 
developments. Asian financial outlook is susceptible to four significant factors that may grow 
into bigger threats. These include: over-heated economies and excessive reliance on export-led 
growth models; faulty reserve-accumulation models; narrow export market limited to western 
vendors only; and weaknesses in institutional mechanisms and legal backstops to carry out 
financial regulation and supervision. Therefore, to address shocks emanating from the Eurozone 
crisis, Asian countries need to work on a dual objective. First, to cultivate new domestic and 
regional sources of growth and second to foster markets in the less developed countries of the 
region, where financial sector development is a critical factor.  
Another challenge facing Asian countries is finding ways to formulate structures that will 
allow them to speak with a common voice in the international regulatory landscape, in order to 
balance the US and EU influence in this sphere. In this context, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 
could, with requisite modifications, provide a suitable mechanism, with the AFSD playing a 
similar role in the context of the FSB. This crisis has also brought back to light questions 
regarding international currency arrangements, which have largely been abandoned since the 
1970s when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed. In this context, 
proposals have been put forward by the Stiglitz Commission and the PRC which begin with the 
premise that, as demonstrated by the current global financial crisis, the risks of the current 
system of floating exchange rates exceed its benefits and fail in the overall objective of 
supporting trade and enhancing economic growth and financial stability.196 In place of the 
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current system, both propose a new system based on an international reserve currency 
disconnected from individual nations able to remain stable. The eye-catching agreement in 2006 
in respect of Asian Currency Unit (ACU), which might be a first step on the long road to an 
‘Asian Euro’, reflected that Asian leaders were willing to enhance financial cooperation.197 This 
however, is a long-term vision, requiring a long-term process with step-wise milestones to meet.  
Moreover, it is not controversial, even though it does challenge orthodox thinking, to 
argue that financial integration is not always beneficial. Despite the increased importance of 
enhanced regionalism and integration, policy formulation must take a balanced view. The 
European crisis provides a deep insight to the risks of integration and identifies mistakes not to 
be repeated in following integration plans elsewhere. For example, for the banking integration 
framework (ABIF), in the short term, it should deliver its promise to facilitate economies of 
scale, a bigger market, technological transfer and information sharing i.e., ‘the soft-
infrastructure’ but in the long term, it should aim for financial stability through consolidated 
integration i.e., the ‘hard infrastructure’.198  
This balanced view of integration offers further perspectives: Firstly, that the soundness 
and credibility of domestic policies are not substitutes for regional commitments even though, at 
times when domestic policies are ‘stuck’, regional commitments can help to ‘tie hands’ and exert 
external pressure. Secondly, rather than imposition of strict benchmarks and milestones to meet 
the idiosyncrasies of individual economies, the integration framework should facilitate and 
encourage the growth of regional economies while allowing the market to work freely. Thirdly, it 
doesn’t matter how much integration or liberalization has been achieved in the region, but what 
matters is that regional approaches and small steps of cooperation will result in the Asia being 
more integrated and on the path to a reduced dependence on western markets which can bring 
more growth, development and stability to the region while lowering associated contagion-driven 
risks. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Sohn, I. (2006). East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving 
International Monetary Order. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & Group of 
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http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/13408/1/East%20Asias%20Counterweight%20Str
ategy%20Asian%20Financial%20Cooperation%20and%20Evolving%20International%20Monetary%20
Order.pdf?1.  
198 Siswanto, J., & Wihardja, M. M. (May 31, 2012) 
	   66	  
V.  Implications for East Asia 
Owing to substantively divergent levels of development, institutional and legal structures, and 
political systems, East Asian economies lag behind European and North American economies in 
financial integration. At the same time, both trade and investment flows in the region have grown 
very rapidly over the past 20 years. The Asian financial crisis in late 1990s provided an impetus 
for more financial integration within the region. One group of scholars perceive differences 
between EU and East Asian financial integration as a matter of degree and not of nature.199 
According to this school of thought, regulatory convergence takes time; whereas, the quality and 
sustainability of convergence is the key to the success of the whole process itself.200 Given this 
context, the European example constitutes a major significant precedent and as a laboratory of 
economic, legal, and political integration transcending national borders. 
The Eurozone debt crisis has clearly exposed the weaknesses of regulatory structures 
divided along national lines when these have to deal with integrated cross-border financial 
markets. It has also highlighted the limited range of policy choices available from within the EU 
/ EMU system as it existed prior to 2008. As a result, the EU faces a number of hard choices 
extending to the intractable trade off between national sovereignty and collective financial 
stability. The plans to establish a European banking union within the boundaries of the Eurozone, 
which will include a single supervisor and, in the future, a single resolution authority and a pan-
European deposit guarantee scheme, have clearly tilted the balance towards further centralization 
and pooling of sovereignty.  
From the EU regulatory reforms discussed above, three initiatives stand out. First, plans 
to centralize supervision for Eurozone banks through the SSM, which will come into force in 
2014. This will mean that the ECB201 is poised to take over as the prudential supervisor of the 
Eurozone banking sector. Second, EU plans for the harmonization of member state resolution 
laws and introduction of integrated resolution structures are in the process of implementation. 
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200 Smaghi, L. B. (2012). Convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons and Non-lessons from the 
Crisis. In T. Bracke & R. Martin (Eds.), From Crisis to Recovery: Old and New Challenges in Emerging 
Europe [electronic resource] Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137034830 Palgrave 
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201 It should also be noted that the ECB had never had a ‘treaty-based’ mandate to act as shock-absorber 
in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link 
in the EU reform process. 
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Third, the development of common EU rulebooks for the single market by the European 
Supervisory Authorities is proceeding rapidly. Another area of particular importance is the 
adoption by the EU, through the ESM (and the European Banking Union), of measures, which 
aim at breaking the link between levels of sovereign indebtedness and bank bail outs. A very 
important lesson is how the EU has recently apportioned the costs of the Cyprus rescue to private 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, bondholders and large depositors, treating essentially the 
latter as investors.202 
EU Member States have set up, in the course of the last 60 years, institutions in order to 
manage the challenges of a multi-faceted integration process and provide acceptable structures 
for political and democratic accountability. EU institutions have also been used by the Union in 
order to accumulate knowledge and expertise that may be useful in responding to new 
challenges. But we should be careful in arguing that the EU institution-building experience, or 
for that matter the EU integration process, given the specific characteristic of internal market,203 
can be used as the only reform template, although they can indeed provide model lessons to the 
rest of the world.204  
The impact of institutions dealing with financial markets has mostly been ignored, 
probably because economists regarded such impact as ‘unimportant’205 in a free market 
environment. So while the EU is obliged to take drastic steps to cover gigantic gaps in its policy 
and regulatory framework to prevent irrevocable fractures in financial integration, it still needs to 
proceed with caution, as all this is untested territory. This caveat puts the usefulness of lessons 
drawn on EU institution-building experience in the right context.206 Moreover, it should be noted 
that the ECB had never had a ‘treaty-based’ mandate to act as shock-absorber in the Euro area 
sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link in the 
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  example,	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204 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). 
205 Allen, F. (2001). Do Financial Institutions Matter? Journal of Finance, 56, 1165-1175. 
206 Allen, F., & Carletti, E. (2011). New Theories to Underpin Financial Reform. Journal of Financial 
Stability. doi: 10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.001  
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EU reform process. Finally, the European Banking Union may not be seen as an entirely 
irreversible development. Taxpayers and governments from both the core and the periphery of 
the Eurozone may, in the end, decide that the wider and abstract good of further European 
integration and of the stability of the single market is not worth the loss of sovereignty, and 
perennial austerity and sacrifice of national interest that they seem to entail. Accordingly, East 
Asian economies, must find which parts of the European project are successful and suitable to 
them to adopt and which parts are either of dubious success or would lead to an intolerable loss 
of sovereignty in a region that is not accustomed to any considerable degree of political 
integration. 
Where, however, the EU experience is invaluable is in supplying policy-makers with 
irrefutable evidence about the axiom that, although financial markets may be established 
anywhere, provided that certain property rights are recognized by local law, in the absence of 
restrictions on cross-border flows, their stability may only be guaranteed through appropriate 
institutions and not by reliance on market forces’ rationality and co-ordination. Therefore, 
arrangements to safeguard the stability of the cross-border market cannot be delayed until formal 
integration efforts reach a peak in Asia, whether in the form of establishment of a single currency 
area, or otherwise. Waiting until then might prove fatal to the Asian financial integration process. 
Therefore, in the East Asian context building the necessary infrastructure for the operation of 
integrated financial markets is very important.207  
 In the case of East Asia the complexities involved in harmonizing common practices, 
standards, and specifically the legal rules for such diverse economies mean that European 
Banking Union type institutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future. Yet this does not mean 
that the leadership of those countries should not think about the challenges to financial stability 
created by increasing market integration and financial interconnectedness in the region. It only 
means that for the time being, other less strongly integrative measures, such as subsidiarisation, 
are probably more suitable and effective in the East Asian context than the EU’s plans for 
centralization of cross-border bank supervision and resolution. In addition, while establishment 
of a single regulator with power to intervene and discipline banks in ASEAN+3 is probably not 
feasible at present, building a macro-supervisory umbrella is essential for the undisturbed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 ASEAN+3’s ‘Group of Experts’ initiative in securities clearing is a first step in this respect. See also 
above, s. IV.C.1. 
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continuation of East Asian integration. In such a case, the function of macro-prudential oversight 
ought to be discharged by an independent body in order to secure credibility and authority, even 
if it is a soft law body.  
Arguably, in an increasingly globalised world, formal international cooperation in the 
field of financial stability and cross-border bank supervision and resolution, might in the long 
run come to be seen as a necessary ingredient of national prosperity in an environment where 
national financial markets are closely integrated.208 This would become especially the case if on-
going national and regional reforms prove to be less successful than expected.209 Building 
multilevel financial governance in a region as economically and politically integrated as the EU 
is infinitely less complicated than a similar attempt at the global scale. The same might apply to 
replication of EU plans in another region. Of course, these may, in the end prove more 
challenges to be overcome rather than insurmountable stumbling blocs. Either way Asian policy-
makers should not assume that they have ample time to deliberate before another major crisis 
breaks out. They should urgently start with the business of augmenting the region’s financial 
stability mechanisms in order to safeguard the future economic prosperity of the region and the 
lesson drawn on the Eurozone crisis may prove very useful in this process. 
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